RISKY PARTNERS

Argentina faces a problematic last quarter as it must keep an eye on two giant troublemakers

Argentina has always been a country in which power is widely concentrated in the hands of the president. And some would argue that Néstor and especially Cristina Fernández de Kirchner have taken such concentration to the extreme.

Another interesting point about the current president is that — less than three months away from ending her presidential term — she is far from losing her influence. She has not become the weak, lame-duck president that those in the opposition had predicted and hoped for. Fernández de Kirchner still continues to hold the political initiative and it is quite evident that her ministers and deputies seem quite reluctant to take the initiative independently.

As for civil servants, they reflect this too, and depend too much on the orders of their political masters. Those enamoured with this system will tell you that it is the only way to make sure that the decisions taken respect the wishes of the voters, or — more dramatically — “the people.” But they are wrong.

The job of those who are voted into office and their politically appointed ministers is to set the guidelines and objectives for public policies, in line with their views which, in theory, are legitimized by elections. Then, their civil servants’ job is to implement them.

It is not a civil servant’s job to make foreign policy, but it is very much their responsibility to get things done, monitor relationships and make sure that existing policies are in good shape, and to sound the alarm when something goes wrong. But right now, either the alarms are not sounding accurately or nobody seems to be listening to them.

Lacking in vigilance?

Currently, criticism about a lack of vigilance in foreign policy will be immediately rebuked by pointing out to the government’s anti holdouts/“vultures” campaign at the United Nations or the battle against New York City judge Thomas Griesa. It should be noted that the battle at the UN — if won — would be a feather in Argentina’s international hat, but too late for this country. Griesa has already happened, and the situation is now more of a legal quagmire set for the next government to take over than a big target for the MFA’s efforts.

Meanwhile, although this writer hopes to be proven wrong, there are other clear and present dangers on the foreign policy front for Argentina, with the compliments of our main international partners.

One of them is Brazil. Its recent devaluations are likely to have a negative impact on Argentina, while there is also a strong pro-devaluation industrial lobby in Brazil which does not seem too friendly toward Argentina and would clearly prefer to deal with the European Union (EU) directly, leaving Argentina to fend for itself. The lobbying toward Dilma Rouseff is very serious, on account of her current political weakness and very low approval ratings. The combination of negative opinion polls and a precarious economy is likely to undermine any possible pro-Mercosur political determination in Dilma’s mind. That is, if there is any left. Especially because sectors in Uruguay and Paraguay seem to agree with Sao Paolo’s objectives, which are far from committed to Argentina’s views.

Chinese aspirations

And then there is China’s devaluations and its effects on Argentina. The immediate consequence will be that Chinese imports will gain competitiviness, so the prices of Argentine commodities will drop. However, perhaps these are not the most serious problems. CFK has — in a quite ostensive way — aligned Argentina with China as a “strategic partner,” which led to long-term contracts and commitments, not only in terms of trade or financial aid. But many international observers are now suggesting that the relevance of the recent devaluations is more political than financial.

It so happens that China occupies the second-highest position in terms of world trade, but its currency, the yuan, occupies a meagre ninth position in terms of internationally traded currencies, something that does not make the Chinese Government happy. Beijing seems determined to change that, in order to receive the prestige of being an internationally traded currency, on a par with the US dollar, the euro, the Swiss franc the Japanese yen or pound sterling. These are the five currencies included in the “basket” which makes up the IMF’s foreign exchange reserve assets, the Special Drawing Rights. China wants to join the prestigious club. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) though has closed the door on account of the fact that the yuan is not traded in free markets. As a result, say some, China might have attempted with is three devaluations in a row to show its capacity for damage to the world.

A currency war? We should hope not. It does not seem prudent to be the strategic partner of a nation at war — even if only financially — with the IMF and the big capitalist countries.

@andresfederman

CREDITS: BUENOS AIRES HERALD

CHINESE STRINGS

Whatever happens at the polls, some ties won’t break

In the last 12 years, first Néstor Kirchner and then Cristina Fernández de Kirchner have introduced drastic changes in Argentina’s foreign policy alignments.

It is quite noticeable how China and Russia have replaced the US and Europe as Argentina’s non-regional partners of choice — and the way in which this country has strengthened its ties with countries like Ecuador and Venezuela. All this is reflected in the formal political statements, in the narrative and — quite clearly — in Argentina’s trade, investment and financial relations.

There is a general agreement on the fact that China is not longer a communist state. But there is also a consensus that it would be equally wrong to say it is a capitalist state comparable to the US or the EU countries. It is also quite clear that, even if the cold war is something of the past, China — as well as, but not always together with Russia — competes in geopolitical terms with the US and its European partners. And that such state of affairs is very noticeable in Latin America.

China’s LatAm role

One of the most significant elements in this scenario is the new role currently played by Beijing in the region’s finances. In addition to its financial involvement in Brazil, China is nowadays the largest source of funding for Venezuela, Ecuador, and Argentina. And Chinese developmental banks’ investments in Latin America are larger than those of the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank.

Last week, Venezuela’s government triumphantly announced that it had obtained a new loan from the Chinese government. It was possibly the only piece of good news for Caracas, at a time when the country is facing a new crisis of violent demonstrations and lootings. However, the news on the loan was not too surprising — especially because the Chinese lender expects to be paid back in oil and not in cash.

Commodities exchange

A good percentage of the Chinese financing in Latin America is linked directly or indirectly to other deals that have to do with commodities — oil from Venezuela, agricultural exports from Argentina — or, as it happens like in Ecuador, with projects in which there is a significant involvement of Chinese companies.

Consequently, countries like Venezuela, Ecuador or Argentina are likely to have an easier life at the time of negotiating finances. Which, when combined with trade or investment, offer more room for flexibility. The more elements there are on the negotiating table, the easier it is to exchange concessions. Much more so if politics are part of the equation.

Financial negotiations with China often have an even more important advantage for these three Latin American countries, which share unorthodox economic policies that are often anathema for bankers. The latter’s priority is profit, and, therefore, they need to satisfy their boards, shareholders, auditors and regulatory authorities. By contrast, state negotiators are held accountable by political masters and their objectives. And these will often prioritize the political over the financial gains involved in a loan or a joint venture.

Future foreign policy

This has worked well for both China and Argentina during the Kirchners’ presidencies. So the question is what will happen after December 10.

Opinion polls suggest that the only two real competitors are the FPV’s Daniel Scioli or — through the intricacies of a two-round election — PRO’s Mauricio Macri.

In the last few months, Scioli has kept busy making clear his alignment with CFK’s policies. He was so successful that the purists within FPV who rejected him as a right-of-centre infiltrator shifted their narrative to a warm support. The fact that his vice-presidential candidate is Carlos Zannini —who is considered to be one of the government’s key strategists — has likely helped.

Scioli’s competitor Mauricio Macri has also been busy explaining that he agrees with, and will not drastically change, some of the basic tenets of this government’s policies. He mentioned social benefits and nationalizations. But he did not include foreign policy in that list.

In any case, drastic changes in Argentina’s international alignments would not be easy. True, it is relatively easy to change the rhetoric, or the statements in international organizations which a nation-state endorses. It is less easy to move away from financial commitments or trade patterns.

Argentina would need to find new lenders and new clients for its exports. None of this happens at short notice. So, whatever happens in the presidential election, Argentina’s ties with China are likely to remain strong for the foreseeable future.

@andresfederman

CREDITS: BUENOS AIRES HERALD

HELLAS’ DEFIANCE

Athens’ foreign policy reflects its economic worries

H.A.L. Fisher’s History of Europe published in the early 1930s became a classic on the subject. Even more so, the first sentence: “We Europeans are the children of Hellas.” Which comes to mind when watching the current crisis between Greece and its EU partners as well as the IMF over a bailout for the country’s debt crisis. At the time of writing this, it is still an open-ended affair. But a temporary exclusion from the euro is one of the — unprecedented — options being considered.

The EU has one of the most sophisticated and all-embracing institutional and political mechanisms to be found in the international scene.

Even more so when you add to that, the particular provisions of the EU member states that joined the Euro and are part of the Eurogroup. So some observers say that it is difficult to believe that it is not able to cope with the Greek crisis. And argue that the real problem is to be found elsewhere. Politics — they say — is the burning issue.

The Tsipras effect

They remark that Hellas has challenged its EU children. And Hellas will now have to pay the price of its defiance, which has to do with something new,and quite unprecedented in the EU political mainstream. Namely, a Prime Minister like Alexis Tsipras.

His party, Syriza, is not your usual, moderate, centre-left European Social Democratic political creature. Tspiras and his party have a clearly left-of-centre tradition which shows in the policies they implement.

Although Greece’s current debt problems and bailout negotiations are not new, Tsipras’ way of dealing with them is far from traditional. When he was inaugurated in early 2015, debt was — of necessity — at the top of his priorities. But the negotiations were far from easy.

So when, on June 25, the European Commission, the IMF and the European Central Bank put forward their list of bailout conditions, the Greek government decided to submit them to a referendum, which was called for last Sunday.

Tsipras and his party clearly pushed for a ‘no’ vote.

Which was the overwhelming 61 percent result that was celebrated not only on Athens’s streets but also with congratulatory messages from some foreign leaders. Cristina Kirchner was one of them.

If the Greek government was trying to use the referendum to strengthen its negotiating position, it clearly failed.

So much so that less than one week later it put forward to Parliament a number of laws implementing all the European conditions. The bad news came when it became clear that the roles had reversed and Europe had become the reluctant negotiator.

Conflicting agenda

The language being used by both sides is quite revealing about the different — and conflicting — political agendas.

The European negotiators plainly say that they do not trust the other side. And that a bailout should be backed by adequate guarantees that the Greek government will comply with its commitments.

The Syriza politicians argue that the “Northern European elites” and the bankers, which have “complete control” of Europe, want to get rid of them and their prime minister. And they might have a point.

Hellas’ defiance of its EU children goes beyond economic policies. In fact, Tsipras’ foreign policy does not make many EU leaders happy.

‘dead end policies’

In the six months that his party has been in government, Greece has made a number of friendly gesture towards Russia.

It condemned the EU sanctions imposed on Moscow over the Ukraine issue. Just before visiting Russia the Prime Minister said that economic sanctions are “dead end policies.” And the government is courting Gazprom — the Russian hydrocarbons company — investment in Greece. Which seems quite logical if one takes into account the fact that Russia supplies the country’s oil.

To add to the EU’s worries, Greece is also increasing its ties with China. Like in the case of Russia — but with better chances given the latter’s deteriorated finances — investment is being sought. In addition — and this might be the most sensitive point — there are rumours about Greece trying to sell its government bonds to Tehran.

Interestingly enough, people in Montevideo who do not like CFK’s government are quick to associate Argentina with Greece. They jokingly point out to Axel Kiciloff’s tie-less dress code, shared with the Greek prime Minister. But when the joke is over, they remark that Greece seems to be seeking the same partners as Argentina and Venezuela. And they do not mean it as a compliment.

@andresfederman

CREDITS: BUENOS AIRES HERALD

FOREIGN POLICY AFTER DECEMBER 10

It won’t be plain sailing for the winners of the next elections

What will be the shape of Argentina’s foreign policy under a new presidency? Most pundits agreed, even before last Saturday, that there are only two candidates with serious chances in the next Presidential elections: Mauricio Macri and Daniel Scioli.

Macri’s message is quite straight and clear. He espouses market-friendly policies and a tougher line against crime. And, on foreign policy, a return to the traditional international partnerships with the EU and the US.

As for Scioli, he is (was?) considered to be a moderate politician and people imagined him to be more market-friendly than the national government. The same could be said about his foreign policy. So much so that, at some stage, there even was speculation that President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner was not in favour of him being the Victory Front’s (FpV) candidate.

However, last week brought significant surprises.

The candidacies being put forward by the “Cristinistas,” from Carlos Zannini for the vice-presidency to some of the hard-liners nominated for the seats in Congress, predict a continuity of current policies should the FpV win the elections.

And the national government’s foreign policy leaves no doubt about preferences, sympathies and alignments. Last week, this daily reported Economy Minister Axel Kicillof as saying that ties between Buenos Aires and Moscow were “a fact, not a wish,” praising the bilateral relationship’s “natural understanding.”

He was by no means a lonely voice in the government. Earlier this year, on April 23, during her visit to Moscow, Argentina’s president told her Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, that “both our countries are commemorating the 130th anniversary of the bilateral relationship by signing an ‘agreement on Strategic Integration.’”

Russia is not the only non-Western power with which this government has forged close links. During her visit to Beijing the president entered an “Integral strategic alliance” which — in her words — should not be limited to trade and investment but also extend to cultural and communications affairs. In her speech, Cristina also mentioned Argentina and China’s mutual support over their respective international claims.

Mauricio Macri shows a similar determination, but in the opposite direction. Last December, when he visited Europe he clearly specified his preference for Argentina rebuilding its links with the European Union and the United States. He was critical of the links with President Nicolás Maduro’s Venezuela as well as — albeit with less vehemence — with the alignment with China and Russia.

True, the old times in which the then-Communist Soviet Union and the — also Communist — People’s Republic of China were a unified block, are something of the past. And that China as well as Russia have trade, investment and financial relations with the EU and the US. But it is also true that China and Russia do confront each other on different issues — sometimes as allies — with the Western countries.

In the case of Russia, currently the most serious issue of confrontation is Moscow’s policy toward Ukraine. There is also a — not as burning — battle with the US to gain influence in Latin America.

China has its own problems with the US. One of them is the dispute over the South China Sea as well as some of its islands. There are several — and in some cases conflicting — claims against China from Indonesia, Taiwan, The Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand and Singapore. Some of these countries are close allies of the US which makes its presence known in the area so as to prevent China using its military might to intimidate its weaker neighbours. The usual choreography in those cases — military exercises or “exploratory” flights over the region in conflict — triggers angry protests from Beijing.

In addition, there are several disputes over trade. The basic problem is that China’s very low labour costs turn that country into a complicated competitor, something that affects manufacturers in many countries, some of which do not have many options because they need other things from Beijing. But the US manufacturers have enough political clout so as to stop Chinese exports and to get their government to lobby against other governments on their behalf.

Some more trouble

Some international observers note that both China and Russia are facing economic troubles which affect their people. And one of the ways in which both governments could be tempted to mitigate their own political difficulties is with some doses of anti-US nationalism. The solution of which, is definitely not conflict-free.

The optimists in the “Cristinista” camp could be happy. They believe that they are playing the right foreign policy game. But they might be wrong. Argentina depends on the US and the EU over a number of issues. The most urgent — but not the only one — is access to financial markets. So at some stage, they would have to try and have some kind of rapprochement. Which might not be easy if the alignment with “the other side” gets stronger.

The optimists in Macri’s side might be equally happy. The open arms of the EU and the US are likely to be waiting for them. However, they could also be wrong. The recovered old friends might expect some signals in exchange. But Argentina’s strategic alliances with China and Russia go beyond statements at the UN General Assembly. There are contracts signed, joint ventures agreed upon and financial aid has been accepted. Disengaging from them is far from easy and could be quite expensive.

There will not be easy times ahead for the winners of the next elections.

CREDITS: BUENOS AIRES HERALD

CRISTINA, VLADIMIR AND FRANCIS

Embracing the pope and the new world order

It was back in 1944. In the midst of a meeting about the post-war world, Winston Churchill was explaining his views about the moral power of the Roman Catholic Church. Joseph Stalin interrupted him with a sarcastic comment disguised as a question: “How many divisions does the Pope of Rome have?” Stalin asked , making it clear that he only believed in military might as a source of power.

More than 70 years later, it is quite clear that those who succeeded Stalin at the Kremlin — especially after the fall of the Soviet Union — have different views about the power of the Vatican. Last Wednesday, Vladimir Putin visited the pope in Rome. It was their second meeting, and the situation in Ukraine was at the top of their agenda. Putin was not the first Kremlin leader to visit the pope.

Quite often, Argentines are said to be too self-centred and always ready to be convinced that whenever anything happens in the world, it must have some kind of link to Argentina. This writer believes that — perhaps in most occasions — it is a fair assessment. But, at the same time, in view of some of last week’s news, a look at the links that associate President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, Pope Francis and Vladimir Putin might show some unexpected developments. There are several facts as well as some indicators, which stem from educated speculation, that seem to underpin this view.

Some facts: Russia and Argentina have publicly announced their strategic alliance. The alliance encompasses technological cooperation in areas like the generation of nuclear power that is needed by Argentina. Argentina in turn provides food exports to Russia that are quite important at a time when the EU and the US are sanctioning Moscow because of Ukraine, especially since there seem to be plans to extend the enforcement of these sanctions. Also, in political terms, Argentina supports Russia’s position in its conflict with Ukraine. And Moscow reciprocates by supporting Argentina’s sovereignty claim over the South Atlantic Islands. The alliance also implies a shared and critical view of the United States and of some its important EU partners.

It is also a fact that, when Jorge Bergoglio became Pope Francis, the Argentine president was quick to send friendly signals to Rome, putting an end to the several years of confrontation between the Kirchners and Bergoglio. These signals were acknowledged and reciprocated in terms of offering quick and quite frequent access to the Vatican, not only for Cristina, but also for several members of her inner circle.

Pope Francis has also made friendly gestures toward Putin. He has not condemned Russia’s policy on Ukraine, limiting his messages to a call for peace, asking Christians not to kill each other. And this message had some clearly identified addressees, including the Russian Orthodox and the Eastern Catholic Churches — permanently at loggerheads with each other.

Then there is the informed speculation. First, there is the fact that many top brains in the government are seriously convinced that the world is quickly changing its geopolitical shape. They point out at several indicators that range from China’s new role in the world to the emergence of the BRICS, the association of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. The economic problems in Europe underpin the Kirchnerites’ view, who remark that the end of US hegemony is here or just around the corner. Which, in turn, shows that the way forward is for strong states that, under regional associations, regulate their economies and manage — within this framework — their trade and investment relations .

Those who follow the Vatican closely emphasize the Pope’s activism which he has applied to hands-on conflict resolution, global in scope from Eastern Europe to the Middle East. They also insist on assigning a Peronist DNA to Francis, explaining such identity in terms of a geopolitical view of the world in which countries should not accept the place pre-assigned to them by the great powers.

As for the style, it implies the ability to find the adequate political task for each political leader, which can be determined by the possibility of assigning specific and appropriate roles to each of them. The obvious resemblance is to Perón who, from his Madrid exile, managed to be a more than significant player in Argentina’s politics. The observers speculate that Bergoglio has exactly the same ability. And that the future he envisages for Ms. Kirchner is that of being his informal ambassador, operating as a unifier and trouble-shooter in Latin America. It should be noted that this view, which many will see as a mere pipedream, was put forward by serious and non-Peronist operators.

@andresfederman

CREDITS: BUENOS AIRES HERALD

LAST CHANCE FOR THE MERCOSUR?

The reasoning behind Uruguay’s breach of protocol

It all happened last week. On Monday, Walter Cancela, Uruguay’s Ambassador to the European Union (EU) belied reports suggesting his government was in favour of the Mercosur entering free trade agreements with the European bloc, without waiting for the conformity of all member countries. Brazil’s Dilma Rouseff seems to be choosing this road as well.

Although not specifically mentioned in public statements, the dissident member states are Argentina and Venezuela.

On Thursday, 4 June, Uruguay’s Foreign Minister Rodolfo Nin Novoa told the press that Cancela was wrong, that he had spoken out of turn and that foreign policy decisions are made by the president, Tabaré Vázquez. Consequently, Nin Novoa said, Cancela would be removed from the job. Later, the foreign minister then toned down Cancela’s “punishment,” explaining that rogue ambassador had been slapped on the wrist but not sacked.

Believe it or not, this succession of events was quite extraordinary. But surely they weren’t the end of the world. Having said that, it is not the done thing for a government to publicly sack or even tell off an ambassador posted abroad. Surely all governments reprimand or sack their diplomats, and possibly quite frequently. But they do it silently and not in the public eye. In other words: much more diplomatically. (Pun intended.)

The politics behind the affair are relatively easy to explain. Although President Vázquez belongs to the same party as his predecessor José “Pepe” Mujica, it is public knowledge that they belong to different factions within the Frente Amplio, and do not see eye-to-eye on many issues.

Moreover, Vazquez is known to be even less enamoured than his predecessor with the current Argentine government. And politicians from Uruguay — as well as those from Paraguay — have been lobbying against what they have seen as Argentina’s feet-dragging on an agreement with the EU. As in the case of Uruguay, there is no love lost for the Mercosur in Paraguay.

But — being the smaller members — both Uruguay and Paraguay were lonely voices in the Mercosur desert. Until quite recently, that is, when — perhaps pushed by her country’s current economic difficulties — Rousseff altered Brazil’s traditional position. She is now in favour of a “two-speed” agreement. In other words, member states should have the liberty of speeding up or delaying free trade negotiations with the EU, according to the Brazilian president.

Good news for Montevideo

The change in Brazil’s policy was good news in Uruguay. In addition to the president’s position, the opposition shares the negative perceptions of Mercosur. There are, obviously, some relevant exceptions. Walter Cancela is one of them. But he is a legacy of Mujica’s time. In fact, the latter was quick to join the political fray within the Broad Front, and, on June 4, he went public voicing his disagreement with Vázquez’s position. Which explains his follower, Cancela’s, rather undisciplined ways.

There is some speculation that the disagreement about the Mercosur’s direction, between incumbent president and predecessor has also occurred in Brazil, between Rousseff and former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Who — by the way — met President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner last Saturday to discuss unspecified “regional issues.”

If they chatted abut Mercosur, and were sincere with each other, they might have agreed that, unfortunately, the Mercosur bloc is at present far from a shining success story. The list of mutual complaints is quite long. The current disagreement between Argentina and Brazil about automobile trade is just one case in point. But, if the two big partners find it difficult to compromise with each other, there is obviously very little hope for the smaller and weaker partners. They simply lack the necessary leverage

Likewise, Mercosur does not seem to be very apt as a negotiating tool with third parties. The discussions about a trade agreement with the EU started exactly 20 years ago. And it seems quite clear that nothing, or almost nothing, has been achieved. True, the blame should be placed both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. But it is also true that other regions have managed to overcome difficulties and agreements with the EU are now in place.

The Washington effect

But what is even more worrying for the “two-speed” advocates is the fact that the EU seems likely to conclude a free trade agreement with the US quite soon. Does this matter? Yes. Other trade partners could suffer serious damages. And it seems that many decision makers in Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay are beginning to feel that the Mercosur is more of a liability than an asset. And that it is not delivering.

Some even say that the dream of the 1980s needs a complete overhaul or that it should be replaced by something different and more up to date.

So much so, that they are prepared to risk serious damage to the bloc and its future, or the wrath of reluctant partners like Argentina and Venezuela, in order to move forward over an agreement with the EU, which potentially seems to be more beneficial.

Possibly, this explains the Uruguay breach of protocol this week with their ambassador in Brussels, in order to avoid sending the wrong signals to the possible EU partners.

@andresfederman

CREDITS: BUENOS AIRES HERALD

CHINA: BEYOND THE GOOD NEWS

Latin American influence being wrestled away from US

Last week our Brazilian neighbours and brothers concluded their own special strategic partnership package deal with China. Predictably, and given the difference in the size of both economies, the numbers involved in the Brazilian deal are larger than those of the deal with Argentina. But the impact on the respective economies is likely to be impressive. And welcome by both governments.

To say that “beggars are not choosers” sounds too harsh as well as unfair at the time of describing the context of these agreements. But it can be safely argued that China’s two South American partners were facing economic difficulties at the time of negotiating the deals. Which is likely to have made their negotiators a bit more concessive. Such is life, and there is nothing intrinsically wrong with that.

It is a truism by now to say that China is making a sustained effort to have a strong presence in the region. How much political power and influence will this mean for China as a world power is still an unknown factor. What is not unknown is that the Chinese advance is causing concern in Washington DC.

It could gallantly be said that, if Washington is concerned, it is its own problem. And that their opinion should not influence the policies in independent South American countries. But it would be wishful (and reckless) thinking. Even if geopolitics in the world are changing and the US — although still the most powerful world player — is not any more as omnipresent as it used to be. Washington still has considerable damage power. And it should not be forgotten that South America is in their area of influence, and not in China’s.

Moreover, many people who have strong reservations about US domestic and foreign policy, have equally strong reservations about Chinese policies. Which brings up the question about how much thought and time has gone into analyzing the unwritten agenda behind these agreements.

José Alfredo Graça Lima, the Brazilian diplomat who coordinated his country’s negotiators. said that there is no ideology behind this deal. This writer begs to disagree and respectfully suggests that the Itamaraty officer might want to take a new look at Hans Morgenthau’s classic “Politics Among Nations.” Expanding a Nation’s power in a region or in the world, is an ideology as comprehensive and all embracing as you can find.

Hopefully, the authorities in Brazil and Argentina have considered what — unwritten — power games might be associated with these agreements. Some signals are worrying.

As mentioned two weeks ago in this column, the mysterious space base being built by China in Neuquén triggers concerns in Washington as well as in some EU governments. True, China is not openly aggressive any more. But some of its moves in this part of the world make people uneasy about motives and objectives.

AntarcticA is another case in point

China’ presence in Antarctica is steadily and quickly increasing. Last year it opened its fourth research station, and a fifth one is already planned. In addition, it is investing in icebreakers and aircraft adequate to operate in the Antarctic environment. Currently, its investment in Antarctica is the highest amongst the Antarctic Treaty’s member states. Peter Jennings — formerly a senior official in the Australian Ministry of Defence — and currently executive director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute speaks about a “deeper agenda” in China’s Antarctic policy, namely one that is aimed at securing long-term food and energy supplies.

True, the Antarctic Treaty bans any non-scientific extractive activities until 2048. But every commentator adds the caveat that the ban will be in force “as long as the Treaty does not fall apart.” And history teaches that states are willing and able to tear up treaties if they feel that circumstances justify it. Especially if they are powerful enough to do so.

And China can wield that kind of power. Not perhaps in terms of classical military strength, where the US is still ahead. But there are new warfare formats.

Many argue that in addition to air, land and sea, new battlefronts are found in the cyberspace, which is not currently a peaceful virtual territory. And many accuse China to be one of the main aggressors. Battles in the cyberspace are silent. And defeats are often keep silent, something made possible by the fact that there is no body-count to report.

Interestingly enough, neither Antarctica nor the cyberspace are conventional areas of conflict. It is very easy to avoid being pushed by a powerful partner into compromising — and hence unwanted — attitudes on traditional conflicts. It is less easy to get away from — say — a request for some friendly support on Antarctic issues or on cyberspace matters.

Hopefully, there is no small print in the agreements signed by Brazil and Argentina committing cooperation in areas which could become sensitive.

CREDITS: BUENOS AIRES HERALD