A TIME FOR CONCERN

Uncertainty over Argentina’s future foreign policy

In any nation, presidential elections trigger doubts about future foreign policy prospects. That is fairly normal and to be expected. But the particular situation of Argentine politics, as well as the nature of the issues and threats that this country faces, not to mention somewhat limited national capabilities, seem to place it in a highly vulnerable situation.

Perhaps the original sin is the total absence of an explicit basic foreign policy consensus. This conspires against the country’s predictability, a key diplomatic asset. And there are question marks about a number of issues — and even threats — some of which are quite urgent and serious.

One of issues, trade relations with Brazil, is somewhat immediate and has a direct impact on business and employment. To make matters worse, Brazil is facing serious economic problems of its own, which will affect its trade policy. Diplomatic relations with our big neighbour are far from ideal. And any decision or negotiating position offered by Argentina between now and October 25, or November 24 if there is a second round in the Presidential elections, are — of necessity — short term. So it might be prudent to expect a stormy 2015 on this front.

Then there is the — more global — issue of international alignments. The current administration has made a serious shift in Argentina’s foreign policy which — it should be stressed — is quite legitimate, whatever the views that different sectors have about them. China and Russia seem to have replaced the US and the EU as significant partners. And as a result, Argentina has entered into a number of agreements.

The main opposition politicians have been quite critical. Moreover, and to put it candidly, even the FPV hopeful that today seems to be the best positioned, Daniel Scioli, is known to have more traditional preferences in terms of international links.

However, the agreements are there, and Argentina’s partners — both the new and the traditional — must feel intrigued about what will happen after December 10, 2015, if the opposition gets into Government. It should be noted that some of these agreements are quite tight as well as sensitive.

The Chinese aerospace base in Neuquén is a good case in point. It does not make Europe and the US happy. But it might be quite difficult to disengage from that particular situation without paying high costs diplomatic, political or of other kind.

So: will everything remain unchanged or will the new government try to disengage from those situations which would complicate a return to the traditional policies? The question is far from being merely academic. And it could link to another of Argentina’s current vulnerabilities.

Many observers agree that Argentina’s reserve position and financial liabilities (including Judge Griesa’s plaintiffs) is far from brilliant. In addition, financial support — or at least endorsement — from the EU and the US is at a standstill, which has contributed to the current situation. In this context, the Chinese swap/loan agreements have proved to be quite helpful to this government.

Could Beijing use the swaps as leverage to insure the stability of its Neuquén base if the opposition is seen as the next government? And, conversely, are the North Americans and the EU prepared to offer the financial support they would grant to a government of different sign even if the Neuquén base remains in place?

Then there are domestic situations with serious international implications. The Nisman case is the best example, not least because it has personal implications in terms of possible legal liabilities for the president and others in the government.

On March 20, an Israeli minister visited Argentina to participate in the event commemorating the anniversary of the terrorist attack on the Israeli Embassy. In his speech, he spoke highly of the deceased prosecutor. A number of the opposition politicians share the Israeli minister’s positive assessment of Nisman.

But also present was Cabinet chief Anibal Fernández, who badmouths Alberto Nisman on every possible occasion. Definitely a curious situation which does not help the current government’s — already strained — diplomatic relationship with Israel.

Although this in itself is not dangerous, it should be noted that the Nisman /AMIA — as well as the Israeli Embassy — cases are really about terrorism and terrorists. And the disagreements about intelligence and counter-terrorist policies between government and opposition are very evident. This is not safe.

Such divide could tempt a terrorist action so as to stage a provocation in order to benefit from the subsequent confusion. Especially at a time when Argentina’s intelligence services reach new lows every day.

Right now there are a number of non-professional new agents, which seem to have been recruited for their politics and not for their specific experience or professional training, both of which seem to be totally absent from their qualifications.

Clearly, Argentina is quite vulnerable on the intelligence front. And this is — or should be — a cause of serious concern for everybody.

@andresfederman

CREDITS: BUENOS AIRES HERALD