HANDLE WITH CARE

Rumour has it that Russia is courting Argentina. The signs are quite clear. Mr Putin took the initiative of inviting Cristina to a BRICS summit even if it means that — Russia not being the host country — he took the liberty of asking her to someone else’s home. In fact, the invitation had the bonus of allowing the Argentine president the chance of shouting such prestige from the Twitter rooftops.
Argentina is responding with subtle gestures of its own. To those in the know, the presence of several ministers and high level government officers at the celebration of Russia’s national day last week did not go unnoticed. The Argentine government is far from generous with the ministerial time it devotes to activities at the Embassies it hosts.
The new friendship has triggered comments, some quite qualified, about the possible negative impact of these developments, on Argentina’s relationship with the US. True, the Cold War has been over for more than 20 years. Moreover, Russia and the US have occasionally complemented each other in containment policies, at the time of dealing with rogue or extremely rogue states. But these actions are never automatic or even totally predictable. And the fact remains that both big (still super?) powers do not see eye to eye on many issues as well as often competing for regional influence. The most recent example is — obviously — Ukraine.
President Putin’s policies seem aimed at recouping past imperial glories. And it looks as if many Russian voters share his nostalgia. After all, in the last Presidential elections his “United Russia” party obtained 63.6 percent of the vote, almost doubling the total sum of 36.4 percent of votes obtained by his five opponents. So it comes as no surprise that the Russian Federation wants to extend its presence and influence in Latin America. Consequently, Argentina is worth courting.
But: is it worth it for Argentina to be courted by Russia, even at the risk of raising some US eyebrows? Especially because, despite some recent helping hands on several financial matters, the bilateral relation with the US has not been trouble free. The Argentine government does not share the US’s views on some rather important matters that range from relations with Cuba and Venezuela to the role of the IMF and the Security Council. This can — perhaps — be quantifiable in terms of the smallish number of high-level contacts which the Argentine government was offered by the Obama administration, thus contributing to the view of an “isolated Argentina” espoused by opposition columnists and politicians. Following this line of thought, the Russian dimension would only be adding to the aggravation.
The big question brought up by the possibility of closer ties with Russia is what is in it for Argentina. Currently, bilateral trade stands at a — some would say — unimpressive US$ 2,000 million. How much can this be expanded? Will the Russian state-owned company Rosatom — specialized in nuclear power electricity generation, effectively be cooperating more with Argentina in that sector? The improved benefits for Argentina will have to be seen. Whilst the consequences of incurring in the US’s wrath can come quite quickly.
In terms of foreign policy management, Russia should be a more comfortable new friend, especially if compared with the US. The Russian decision making processes seem to be quite centralized, so the number of interlocutors at the time of lobbying and negotiation are limited and clearly defined. This comes handy to the Russian government at the time of linking apparently disconnected issues, thus increasing its negotiating capacity. And — for a foreign policy interlocutor like Argentina — it makes it easier to strike delicate balances in the negotiation.
The other good news is that the US government can be quite pragmatic and — off necessity — it is used to allowing some deviations within its areas of influence. Perhaps it is the privilege of the powerful.
But the very bad news about is that the pragmatism that can be shown by the State Department is easily overtaken by other players. Because, the truth is, that the foreign policy field in the US is full of players. The first point of call is — obviously — the State Department. But — as the Argentine, and many other governments have learned at their own cost — it is frequently necessary to knock on other doors as well. Congress, including both sides of the bipartisan aisle is often a necessary stop. And then there are the specialized lobbying arenas. The Council of the Americas is the best example. It often works as a powerful loudspeaker for the American private sector. Far from being a mere chat shop, what is said there, often finds its way back to influence in Congress and the State Department. After all, many of those who speak there are — at the same time — important contributors to the politicians’ campaigns.
So, if things go forward with Russia while, at the same time, Argentina wants to keep its links with the US, the ideal dictum would be “both and” rather than “either or.” But because the world is far from ideal, the best dictum stamped in Argentina’s foreign policy management with the two big players should be “Handle with Care.” (Please note that — at he time of writing this — the US Supreme Court ruling on the holdouts’ demands is still unknown.)


@andresfederman

CREDITS: BUENOS AIRES HERALD

BRING IN THE EUROCRATS

They do not have good press. And probably never did. There are more than 33,000 of them and each year they get paid an aggregate of 4,200 million euros. Their job is to manage a wide range of issues including environment, trade, human rights and several etceteras. In fact, their decisions deal with matters affecting the daily life of 503 million people living in 27 countries spread across an area of over four million square kilometres. Moreover, they manage the single currency used in 17 of those countries. They come from all over Europe and most of them live in Brussels. Ladies and gentlemen: meet the Eurocrats. They are the political bosses of the European Union and the civil servants working for them.

Eurosceptics complain that the nosy Eurocrats get their fingers into anything and everything from air traffic liberalization, to passenger rights or roaming charges. Europhiles praise them for exactly the same reason. But this multi-target social, political and economic build-up has very humble origins. The first brick of this wall was placed in 1951 with the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community which included six states: Belgium, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Italy and Luxembourg. Beyond economics, the main objective of that intial supranational organization was, in France’s Robert Schuman’s words to “make war not only unthinkable but materially impossible.”

Then came the other bricks, the European Economic Community in 1957 and the European Union in 1991. The successive steps were accompanied with the inclusion of new members and, of course, a dramatic increase in the Union’s supranational element. So much so, that 17 members were ready — by joining the Euro — to resign one of the pillars of sovereignty, monetary and currency policy and management.

True, it has not been an easy road. In fact, right now things look far from rosy in the EU. In the last European elections the (some rabidly) anti-Europeans made impressive, and in some cases frightening, electoral gains. Their blaming of the EU for current unemployment and economic hardship pushed many votes in their direction. It is a serious crisis but by no means the first and surely not the last. But, while politicians from member states and the political heads of the EU scratch their heads and exchange acrimony, their civil servants continue to manage the vast number of issues contained within the EU framework. And containment seems to be the operational word. This allows many matters to be sorted out before they get out of hand.

Meanwhile, on this side of the world, we seem to have significantly less lucky. Obviously, Mercosur’s predecessor, the Argentina-Brazil Integration and Economics Cooperation Programme signed between Raul Alfonsín and José Sarney back in 1985 — which included the “gaucho” as a common currency — was over-ambitious. But even the 1991 Treaty of Asunción and its amendment with the 1994 Treaty of Ouro Preto seem to leave a sense of non fulfilment.

The truth is that, as things stand now, the four original member countries of Mercosur exchange acrimonious accusations. Protectionism seems to be at the top of the list but many other items complete it. Uruguay and Argentina are at rather undiplomatic loggerheads over navigation on the River Plate. Argentina and Brazil seem to be fighting the mother of all battles over the automotive industry agreements, although fortunately many expect an agreement to be reached soon. The list is actually longer. And there seems to be no way of managing them in an orderly and constructive win-win style.

It would be more than unrealistic to think that the EU is a problem-free paradise. Differences and controversies between member states are a daily issue, especially because of the sheer extension of the EU’s remit.

The truth is that the EU survives — and from time to time thrives — thanks to Brussels. A myriad of civil servants deal with issues from human rights to mobile phone tariffs going private, national and supranational interests to be compatible with each other, and submitting give-and-take options to the political masters when issues get complicated.

By no means is this a suggestion that Mercosur should go out and hire 33,000 staffers, let alone spend that kind of money. For the time being, Mercosur’s remit and volume means that the staff requirements would be a very small fraction of that.

But that staff would need clear mechanisms and procedures which today seem not to exist or to be too general to be routinely applicable. Without clear regulations and procedural specifications, even the best treaties are nothing more than a collection of good intentions. And here we come to the sticking point: none of the above is possible without some room for supranationalism. Regional unity means more than presidential family photographs and end-of - summit statements. It also means giving up bits of sovereignty.

This is far from easy to stomach and needs strong political leaderships at national and Mercosur levels to carry it forward. The EU shows that supranationalism is possible and often desirable. So bring in the Mercosur Eurocrats.

@andresfederman

CREDITS: BUENOS AIRES HERALD

BRICS QUESTIONS

Last week brought dreams and nightmares for the government. The news on the Paris Club deal had a positive reception from all sides of the political and press divide, albeit for different reasons. Then came the news about the vice-president’s judicial woes. In a way, back to normal Argentina: dream for some and nightmare for others.

Shoehorned between both items, came Putin’s invitation to share the July 15 BRICS’ summit with the leaders of its member countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, in Fortaleza, Brazil. The message triggered Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s tweeted enthusiasm as well as that of her chief-of-staff. The latter devoted a first (and long) section of his May 29 morning press conference to celebrate the invitation and offer a detailed inventory of the BRICS group’s strengths, even before mentioning Kicillof’s Paris Club deeds.

True, BRICS’ shares of world trade (15%) GDP (25%), and investment (20%) are significant. Add to that 43% of the world’s population and the figures become even more impressive.

But there is a sobering caveat as well as some questions worth asking. The caveat is that, being invited to an exclusive club’s annual dinner, is not necessarily an offer of membership. Some comments from government followers seem to ignore this, despite the Russian Foreign Minister’s own words. News agencies report that he told a press conference that “as far as the possible expansion of BRICS is concerned, this issue requires consensus in this organization. So far, no ideas have been voiced about planning further expansion.”

But, to paraphrase CFK’s tweet, these invitations are not about “tea and cakes” but about business. So this begs the question about what kind of business. On 29 May, Russia signed with Belarus and Kazakhstan a treaty creating the Eurasian Economic Union. Once it has been ratified, it will come into force on January 1, 2015. It is a market of 170 million people and 2.7 trillion dollars. And will guarantee free transit of goods, services, capital and workers. It is clearly business and non political. What role does Russia envisage for its BRICS partners — and possible new members — in this game? If one has to go by Héctor Timerman’s words, Argentine access will come through the Kazakhstan window, by partnering up with this country to help it become the food supplier of the new union. Does the fact that the announcement of the BRICS invitation and the discussions with Kazakhstan came almost at the same time a mere coincidence and consequence of the Foreign Minister’s itinerary?

Or perhaps, the real “business” reason for the invitation is that it is another step in Russia’s efforts to strengthen links with Argentina. There seems to be a generalized consensus that Russia wants to increase its presence in Latin America as part of its eternal (?) competition with the US. True, this is not the cold war any more. But it is not less true that there are some very serious political differences between both sides. The Ukrainian-Crimea issue is the latest but not the only one. In this context, the question of the commitments involved in a possible Argentine membership of BRICS begs asking. There are some issues on which, everybody would agree, it is better to have the US government’s support. The Supreme Court is one of them, and there are others. Words like capital markets, rating agencies and — God forbid — IMF and World Bank immediately come to mind.

So listen to this one: last Friday an (unidentified) senior Brazilian official told Reuters that the five BRICS nations will invest 100 billion US dollars in a new multilateral bank that could start lending in two years. This would be announced at the July 15 Summit. Given the Argentine government’s well known views about the IMF another quote from the same source will sound as music: “The bank will look into the finances of borrowers, but never intervene in their economic affairs.” And the fact that the same official added that “any country can join the bank with a US$100,000 share” in order to obtain loans at lower than market costs will obviously make the July 15 “tea and cakes” absolutely delicious. Especially because the BRICS countries have been trying unsuccessfully to put together this financial institution over the last two years. Perhaps it now comes to happen.

There is a final question which might sound quite petty. How do our Brazilian brothers feel about Putin inviting CFK? Obviously there is nothing wrong with that, and there is no reason to expect a turf war between Russia and Brazil about inviting Argentina or between the latter and Brazil about Cristina attending a BRICS meeting. In any case, it would be desirable that there are no waves between the two biggest members of Mercosur. Especially not at a time when bilateral trade issues are getting so complicated. The situation of the Argentine car industry is a good reminder of that. And speaking about reminders: perhaps the July 15 summit in Fortaleza reminds those in charge of the Mercosur summits that the last one is six months overdue. And there is no shortage of issues to discuss.

@andresfederman

CREDITS: BUENOS AIRES HERALD

BITTER NEIGHBOURS

By Andrés Federman

For The Herald

For many years, the idea of an Argentine-Uruguayan “brotherhood” was taken for granted by the local narrative in schools and official speeches. It was based on two pillars: one is the combination of geography, history and economics linking both countries; the other is a shared culture.

As for the latter, perhaps we should use the widest definition. So it ranges from mate and tango to Onetti and Páez Vilaró as well as Punta del Este, the summer haven for many wealthy Argentines. And many would include in that culture, the odd US dollar that gets lost on its way to AFIP and ends up in Punta del Este real estate or a nest egg in a Uruguayan bank. Nothing too serious. Just honest-to-God Argentine high middle-class tax evasion.

In terms of geography, both countries share — and have to “manage” — the River Plate and the Uruguay River. Not an easy job. Moreover, both countries compete for the merchant shipping business using the same river. This, in fact, triggered the latest spat, when Argentina decided to ban trans-shipment of Argentine cargo at Uruguayan ports. Luis Almagro, Uruguay’s Foreign Minister, accused the Argentine Under- Secretary for Ports, Horacio Tettamanti, of wanting to “harm the Uruguayans.” In turn, the latter replied that Argentina is not going to do the “valet parking” service for the Uruguayan ports. And that somebody in that country is delusional in the belief that Uruguay is going to become a major logistics centre while Argentina simply watches things happen. He defined the struggle for developing Argentina’s merchant shipping and logistic services as “a matter of life or death.”

If we leave shipping and paper mills aside, the most evident of Uruguay’s current woes related to its neighbour stem from Argentina’s own problems, namely the drop in its US dollars reserves. This forces trade restrictions harming Urugua-yan businesses that have in Argentina their main export markets. And it discourages foreign tourism much of which has Uruguay as its summer destination: the number of Argentine tourists last January and February dropped by 17 percent, while Brazilian tourism increased by 36 percent in that same period.

So the brotherhood seems to be going sour. In addition to Almagro’s words, an opinion poll made public last month revealed that 61 percent of Uruguayans consider Argentina to be the country which is less friendly to them. Even President Mujica, during his recent visit to the US made some comments which — although not specific — seemed aimed at the brothers across the River Plate. “We do not take bribes,” was one of them. So when and why did the brotherhood become so acrimonious? Many would agree that the controversy over the Botnia paper mill was the starting point. For Uruguay, that industry is important not only in terms of foreign direct investment or exports but also in terms of bringing jobs and business to an impoverished region of the country. The fact that the late President Néstor Kirchner condoned and endorsed the blocking of the Gualeguaychú — Fray Bentos bridge will not be easily forgotten. The problems listed above, which are not the only ones, continue to add controversies, and seem to be marking an end to the brotherhood era.

Obviously, it takes two to tango, so both sides of the bilateral relation could have done things better, bit their tongue every now and then or be prepared to lose some “family battles” with less of a bitter aftertaste. It may be now water under the bridge.

A realpolitik fan could argue that Argentina’s foreign policy has more important problems than Uruguay. And that it is not Argentina’s job to look after a country which — in any case — has a near to nil retaliatory power. True, this would be at loggerheads with the regional integration and Latin American brotherhood narrative. But that is everyday life in international politics.

More importantly: realpolitik can also be mistaken politik, especially in international relations. In the past few years, Uruguay shifted a good part of its Argentine-dependence towards Brazil-dependence. This change in trade and tourism figures was reflected in Uruguay’s Mercosur policies. In any vote related to Mercosur international trade in general, Uruguay is an automatic ally of Brazil.

So rather than the “little country” (paisito in Uruspeak), we might be looking at the rebirth of the myth that went along with “bilateral brotherhood.” It was “Uruguay is South America’s Switzerland.” And it won’t be very wise to have an acrimonious relation with that kind of country.

@andresfederman

CREDITS: BUENOS AIRES HERALD

PACTA SUNT SERVANDA?

Interest declared: For all its worth, the author believes that the Memorandum of Understanding   which Argentina entered with Iran on January 2013, in order to investigate the AMIA bombing, was a total and absolute mistake. This said, it should be noted that the MOU was subscribed by the Argentine Government and then ratified by Congress.  The fact that only the Government loyalists voted in favour, ignoring the strong views and criticisms from those who opposed it, is - let's face it - a moot point. It is a democratically elected governments' prerogative, especially if it has congressional approval, to make grossly mistaken decisions. 

                                                  

Unfortunately, last week's ruling by a Federal Appeals Court declaring the MOU unconstitutional and suspending it  -at least temporarily - added another mistake to the mistake. And two wrongs do not make one right.

One of the basic legal rules in the relations between states ,is that of " Pacta sunt servanda ". In plain English it means that nation states should stick to the agreements into which they have entered. The recent legal ruling on the Iran MOU, prevents Argentina from complying with "Pacta". There is an exception to "Pacta Sunt Servanda". And it goes by the name "Rebus sic stantibus". It allows the parties to walk away from their agreements if circumstances change. But Rebus applies to fundamental structural situations and not to the decision of an appeals court. Especially, if the latter issues such a ruling fifteen months after the Argentine President announced the MOU and fourteen months after it was passed by Congress.

Possibly, neither the US nor the European countries will be too concerned about Argentina's actions. First, because -despite the apparent moderation of the new Iranian President Hassan Rohani - they are not too close with Iran. And second because they are conscious of the weight they carry, so partners take a more circumspect view about Pacta and Rebus when dealing with them. But there are smaller countries which may think differently. And Argentina has been making an effort, in the past few years, to increase its trade and political links with many of these countries. The way in which Argentina is dealing with the Iran MOU is likely to raise some eyebrows.

Interestingly enough, the MOU never became really operational. During long months it was a case of much ado about nothing. Granted, there was action in the courts from the opponents to the Memorandum and verbal skirmishes between government and opposition. Add to that, a few well publicised meetings of the Jewish Community organizations with the authorities, and that will be the sum total. Moreover, some argue that the Argentine Government fell for the ploy of the centuries-old Persian diplomacy. In order to silence the Argentine demands at the UN General Assembly, it entered into an agreement that could not and would not be implemented. And that -when this became clear -it caused embarrassment to the Argentine Government. So -at this time -both sides benefit a from politically cost-free way out of the whole business.

If that is the case, the Federal Appeals Court obliged the two governments. We will never know this for sure. But, right now, both the Iranian and Argentine Foreign Ministries seem quite comfortable. The Iranians are blaming the ruling for the "lost opportunity" of "uncovering the truth" , thus clearing the Iranian suspects in the process. And the Argentine government claims that the two Federal Court judges stood on the way of the Iranian suspects having to answer questions. A cynic would argue that -given the lack of any progress in the implementation of the MOU - the outcome seems to suit everybody. And ,after all, the Argentine opposition has also scored some points. So everybody can feel happy.

True, the government has annunced that it will appeal the ruling. But those in the know point out that this is a conveniently long process which will last at least twelve months and could -eventually- have a result after this Presidency ends. An eternity in Argentine or even international politics.

Although the MOU with Iran is clearly a foreign policy issue, both government and opposition seem too interested on the domestic implications, so as to lose sight of the international picture. This is partly understandable because of the dimension of the AMIA tragedy. But the fact remains that there is much to learn from the rights and wrongs in the response of the Argentine political system to the AMIA-Iran MOU situation. And about the way in which Argentina enters into international agreements, 

On this point, there is a most interesting sentence in the Australian Government's report to the "UN's Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment." It reads:  "It is Australia’s practice not to ratify a treaty until domestic law and policy ensures compliance with its obligations. A working group of officials from all jurisdictions has been formed to carry forward implementation arrangements". An interesting tip from the Aussies.

@AndresFederman

Credits: BUENOS AIRES HERALD

SPIN REQUIRED

To say that the US and Argentine governments do not see eye to eye on the ways and means of dealing with the challenge of drug trafficking is more than an understatement. Last week, Security Secretary Sergio Berni rebuked what sounded like a US State Department’s critical comment about Argentina still facing “the challenge of controlling the Triple Frontier” with the phrase “they export death.”

There are, in fact, some clear and present policy differences between both countries. One case in point is the role of the military in combating drug trafficking.

To cite the US’ Joint Military Southern Command’s mission statement: “We work with our partners to address the growing threat of transnational organized crime (...) Drug trafficking represents the epicentre of illicit trafficking, serving as the predominant means by which Transnational Criminal Organizations obtain money and increased power in the region” (http://www.southcom.mil/ourmissions).

The Argentine position is that the armed forces have no business in fighting crime. As this daily reported on January 18, Defence Minister Agustín Rossi pointed out that “the National Defence Law prevents the Armed Forces from taking part in any kind of domestic activity” and made it clear that “President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner was not planning to reopen the debate on the issue.” Some readers might think that this is in blatant contradiction with the Army’s current participation in social work. They may be right.

But back to the drugs issue. There is abundant evidence that a number of consignments which leave Argentina, have Europe as a point of arrival. Just remember the 944 kilograms of cocaine seized by the authorities on arrival in Spain, in an aircraft chartered by — at least — one of the Juliá brothers back in 2011. Consequently, a number of EU countries cooperate permanently with Argentina. And this “condemns” the US and Argentina to cooperate with each other, given that both share partnerships with the Europeans. In fact it seems safe to say that — in spite of the shouting matches — the US’ DEA and Argentina cooperate already.

But over and above policy differences, international cooperation in this kind of issues often presents practical problems. Take the case of the so-called “controlled deliveries.” It involves one drug enforcement authority letting a detected consignment leave its frontiers, in coordination with their counterparts in the destination country. This allows the latter to tail the consignment in order to capture the recipients and get hold of the big fish. Wise as this might seem, it has difficulties. In the case of Argentina, the power to authorize such an operation rests with the judiciary. But in many European countries, the authority is in the hands of the enforcement agencies. And reaching agreements between those two different lines of business is not always easy. This is just one example of why good cooperation relations are necessary. Even for hardened professional law-enforcement people, life is easier if their masters are not exchanging derogatory comments.

So what triggered the last confrontation? It is suggested that too many words with too little spin. Take, for example, the first salvo about the triple frontier. It is no secret that the place is a trouble spot. Argentina knows, and the US knows that Argentina knows. So the wording of the report seemed aimed at putting more pressure on Argentina to work harder and — possibly — to allow the US to offer more help. Or to get involved. But those that drafted the State Department’s report, and whoever cleared it for publication, did not take into account Argentina’s internal political situation. It was quite predictable that the opposition press and politicians would pick up the report’s message and use it to fire a broadside against the government.

Berni’s harsh words were — in this context — almost predictable, given the “Cristinista” political style. Berni raised the ante and was — many would say — outright insulting. It was his way of saying “we do not give in to pressure and you know it, so you are not being helpful.” In fact, if the US wanted to achieve any kind of change, it had many more chances to achieve the objective through discreet negotiations.

But Sergio Berni also lost. Government administration, included specifically-targeted funding is not decided by gods. They are decided by frail individuals. And among these frailties we should count that of not liking to be called “death exporters.” So any Argentine application to Washington for funding in that class of issues, or other kind of help, might be rejected or delayed.

So what to do next time? — and sooner or later there will be a next time. A healthy ration of spin used by both sides could do the trick. For the unaware: “spin” is a word coined in the US but then re-coined in the UK — and to the level of total copyright ownership — by former Prime Minister Tony Blair’s people. It essentially means: “Twist and turn so as to give an intended interpretation to a message in order to make it less embarrassing.” Please note. It is not about lying. It is about all involved limiting embarrassment.

@andresfederman

Credits: BUENOS AIRES HERALD

BRAZIL'S RISKY BET

Brazil is hosting the FIFA World Cup next month and the Olympic Games in 2016.In theory, both events are the ideal showcase to project a country's image. Under the headline "The world has their eye on Brazil" , its government announces that 18,000 journalists have been accredited to cover the World Cup. And the broadcasters will be offering conventional TV coverage as well as a number of applications for smart phones. Not to mention the fact that the Brazilian Government plans to offer full 4 G mobile phone service. The latter means that -in addition to conventional press coverage - word of mouth, news, and comments will instantly go around the world through the social networks. And -given the tens of thousands visitors expected - there is much word of mouth potential there. Loads of which will find its way into news programs if they happen to fall short of news.

You cannot envisage a better way of engaging massive non-state audiences, the target of any public diplomacy effort. True, the interest of much of this audience is limited to football, regardless of the venue. But football is amazingly democratic and attracts massive amounts of business and political decision makers. Those are the good news.

The not-so-good news are that a significant number of Brazilians are in a state of protest. Their main grievance is that too much money is being spent on a wrong priority like the World Cup. They demand instead, better health, education and transport services as well as less inflation and corruption. Many of the protesters are middle class students. But, in addition to them, poorer Brazilians who live in the favelas complain about  police brutality as well as being caught in the cross-fire of the war between the police and the drug dealers which have made the shanty towns their stronghold.

Last year, during the Confederation Cup, hundreds of thousands took to the streets to protest about the money being spent on the World Cup. Many were injured and at least one person was killed. Also, a few days ago, a young dancer was beaten to death in a favela. His neighbors accused the police and staged a violent demonstration.

Both groups seem determined to stage more protests next month, during the tournament. And there is no guarantee that the demonstrations will be non-violent. Even if the demonstrators wish to remain peaceful, there is a looming threat posed by the very people in charge of keeping law and order: the police. First because they are putting strong pressure on the government demanding pay increases. And second, because out of lack of training or other motives , the fact is that the recent incident of the dead young dancer was by no means unique.

The people in charge of Brazil's public diplomacy sitting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have good reasons to feel unhappy. Most reports say that the June 2013 massive protests were non-partisan. So there are not many leaders of organized structures with whom to negotiate. The same seems to be the case with the people living at the bottom of the social ladder. Perhaps some leaders are to be found there, but the only way in which they can remain in the leadership is seeming to be as inflexible as possible. As for the police, the government is making a very serious training effort in order to avoid unnecessary violence. But the fine line between enforcement of law and order and wanton violence can get very thin. And then there is the possibility of an agent provocateur within the force.

So there is a possible worst scenario of images of violence and perhaps fatal casualties  depicted in TV sets, printed press, and multimedia platforms as well as photographs and comments from individuals, rolling into  the social networks. And then there is the horror scenario: the same images of violence but with foreign visitors as the victims.

In face of the October Presidential elections, Dilma Rousseff -who only very recently was officially appointed as the PT's candidate - will have much to be concerned about. Imaginably, her government is doing its best in terms of intelligence , training and disciplining of its police force. It would look as there is not much more than it can do.

So Dilma's people seem to have chosen to turn the weakness into a potential strength. The Secretary General of the Presidency, Gilberto Carvalho, stated last week that the Government supports the idea of protests during the World Cup. And that this "would show to the world the full strength of Brazil's democracy".  A brave face for a risky, but unavoidable, bet. Unless, of course, some backroom negotiations with one or more of the players take place successfully.

Credits: BUENOS AIRES HERALD