FOREIGN POLICY AFTER DECEMBER 10

It won’t be plain sailing for the winners of the next elections

What will be the shape of Argentina’s foreign policy under a new presidency? Most pundits agreed, even before last Saturday, that there are only two candidates with serious chances in the next Presidential elections: Mauricio Macri and Daniel Scioli.

Macri’s message is quite straight and clear. He espouses market-friendly policies and a tougher line against crime. And, on foreign policy, a return to the traditional international partnerships with the EU and the US.

As for Scioli, he is (was?) considered to be a moderate politician and people imagined him to be more market-friendly than the national government. The same could be said about his foreign policy. So much so that, at some stage, there even was speculation that President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner was not in favour of him being the Victory Front’s (FpV) candidate.

However, last week brought significant surprises.

The candidacies being put forward by the “Cristinistas,” from Carlos Zannini for the vice-presidency to some of the hard-liners nominated for the seats in Congress, predict a continuity of current policies should the FpV win the elections.

And the national government’s foreign policy leaves no doubt about preferences, sympathies and alignments. Last week, this daily reported Economy Minister Axel Kicillof as saying that ties between Buenos Aires and Moscow were “a fact, not a wish,” praising the bilateral relationship’s “natural understanding.”

He was by no means a lonely voice in the government. Earlier this year, on April 23, during her visit to Moscow, Argentina’s president told her Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, that “both our countries are commemorating the 130th anniversary of the bilateral relationship by signing an ‘agreement on Strategic Integration.’”

Russia is not the only non-Western power with which this government has forged close links. During her visit to Beijing the president entered an “Integral strategic alliance” which — in her words — should not be limited to trade and investment but also extend to cultural and communications affairs. In her speech, Cristina also mentioned Argentina and China’s mutual support over their respective international claims.

Mauricio Macri shows a similar determination, but in the opposite direction. Last December, when he visited Europe he clearly specified his preference for Argentina rebuilding its links with the European Union and the United States. He was critical of the links with President Nicolás Maduro’s Venezuela as well as — albeit with less vehemence — with the alignment with China and Russia.

True, the old times in which the then-Communist Soviet Union and the — also Communist — People’s Republic of China were a unified block, are something of the past. And that China as well as Russia have trade, investment and financial relations with the EU and the US. But it is also true that China and Russia do confront each other on different issues — sometimes as allies — with the Western countries.

In the case of Russia, currently the most serious issue of confrontation is Moscow’s policy toward Ukraine. There is also a — not as burning — battle with the US to gain influence in Latin America.

China has its own problems with the US. One of them is the dispute over the South China Sea as well as some of its islands. There are several — and in some cases conflicting — claims against China from Indonesia, Taiwan, The Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand and Singapore. Some of these countries are close allies of the US which makes its presence known in the area so as to prevent China using its military might to intimidate its weaker neighbours. The usual choreography in those cases — military exercises or “exploratory” flights over the region in conflict — triggers angry protests from Beijing.

In addition, there are several disputes over trade. The basic problem is that China’s very low labour costs turn that country into a complicated competitor, something that affects manufacturers in many countries, some of which do not have many options because they need other things from Beijing. But the US manufacturers have enough political clout so as to stop Chinese exports and to get their government to lobby against other governments on their behalf.

Some more trouble

Some international observers note that both China and Russia are facing economic troubles which affect their people. And one of the ways in which both governments could be tempted to mitigate their own political difficulties is with some doses of anti-US nationalism. The solution of which, is definitely not conflict-free.

The optimists in the “Cristinista” camp could be happy. They believe that they are playing the right foreign policy game. But they might be wrong. Argentina depends on the US and the EU over a number of issues. The most urgent — but not the only one — is access to financial markets. So at some stage, they would have to try and have some kind of rapprochement. Which might not be easy if the alignment with “the other side” gets stronger.

The optimists in Macri’s side might be equally happy. The open arms of the EU and the US are likely to be waiting for them. However, they could also be wrong. The recovered old friends might expect some signals in exchange. But Argentina’s strategic alliances with China and Russia go beyond statements at the UN General Assembly. There are contracts signed, joint ventures agreed upon and financial aid has been accepted. Disengaging from them is far from easy and could be quite expensive.

There will not be easy times ahead for the winners of the next elections.

CREDITS: BUENOS AIRES HERALD

CRISTINA, VLADIMIR AND FRANCIS

Embracing the pope and the new world order

It was back in 1944. In the midst of a meeting about the post-war world, Winston Churchill was explaining his views about the moral power of the Roman Catholic Church. Joseph Stalin interrupted him with a sarcastic comment disguised as a question: “How many divisions does the Pope of Rome have?” Stalin asked , making it clear that he only believed in military might as a source of power.

More than 70 years later, it is quite clear that those who succeeded Stalin at the Kremlin — especially after the fall of the Soviet Union — have different views about the power of the Vatican. Last Wednesday, Vladimir Putin visited the pope in Rome. It was their second meeting, and the situation in Ukraine was at the top of their agenda. Putin was not the first Kremlin leader to visit the pope.

Quite often, Argentines are said to be too self-centred and always ready to be convinced that whenever anything happens in the world, it must have some kind of link to Argentina. This writer believes that — perhaps in most occasions — it is a fair assessment. But, at the same time, in view of some of last week’s news, a look at the links that associate President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, Pope Francis and Vladimir Putin might show some unexpected developments. There are several facts as well as some indicators, which stem from educated speculation, that seem to underpin this view.

Some facts: Russia and Argentina have publicly announced their strategic alliance. The alliance encompasses technological cooperation in areas like the generation of nuclear power that is needed by Argentina. Argentina in turn provides food exports to Russia that are quite important at a time when the EU and the US are sanctioning Moscow because of Ukraine, especially since there seem to be plans to extend the enforcement of these sanctions. Also, in political terms, Argentina supports Russia’s position in its conflict with Ukraine. And Moscow reciprocates by supporting Argentina’s sovereignty claim over the South Atlantic Islands. The alliance also implies a shared and critical view of the United States and of some its important EU partners.

It is also a fact that, when Jorge Bergoglio became Pope Francis, the Argentine president was quick to send friendly signals to Rome, putting an end to the several years of confrontation between the Kirchners and Bergoglio. These signals were acknowledged and reciprocated in terms of offering quick and quite frequent access to the Vatican, not only for Cristina, but also for several members of her inner circle.

Pope Francis has also made friendly gestures toward Putin. He has not condemned Russia’s policy on Ukraine, limiting his messages to a call for peace, asking Christians not to kill each other. And this message had some clearly identified addressees, including the Russian Orthodox and the Eastern Catholic Churches — permanently at loggerheads with each other.

Then there is the informed speculation. First, there is the fact that many top brains in the government are seriously convinced that the world is quickly changing its geopolitical shape. They point out at several indicators that range from China’s new role in the world to the emergence of the BRICS, the association of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. The economic problems in Europe underpin the Kirchnerites’ view, who remark that the end of US hegemony is here or just around the corner. Which, in turn, shows that the way forward is for strong states that, under regional associations, regulate their economies and manage — within this framework — their trade and investment relations .

Those who follow the Vatican closely emphasize the Pope’s activism which he has applied to hands-on conflict resolution, global in scope from Eastern Europe to the Middle East. They also insist on assigning a Peronist DNA to Francis, explaining such identity in terms of a geopolitical view of the world in which countries should not accept the place pre-assigned to them by the great powers.

As for the style, it implies the ability to find the adequate political task for each political leader, which can be determined by the possibility of assigning specific and appropriate roles to each of them. The obvious resemblance is to Perón who, from his Madrid exile, managed to be a more than significant player in Argentina’s politics. The observers speculate that Bergoglio has exactly the same ability. And that the future he envisages for Ms. Kirchner is that of being his informal ambassador, operating as a unifier and trouble-shooter in Latin America. It should be noted that this view, which many will see as a mere pipedream, was put forward by serious and non-Peronist operators.

@andresfederman

CREDITS: BUENOS AIRES HERALD

LAST CHANCE FOR THE MERCOSUR?

The reasoning behind Uruguay’s breach of protocol

It all happened last week. On Monday, Walter Cancela, Uruguay’s Ambassador to the European Union (EU) belied reports suggesting his government was in favour of the Mercosur entering free trade agreements with the European bloc, without waiting for the conformity of all member countries. Brazil’s Dilma Rouseff seems to be choosing this road as well.

Although not specifically mentioned in public statements, the dissident member states are Argentina and Venezuela.

On Thursday, 4 June, Uruguay’s Foreign Minister Rodolfo Nin Novoa told the press that Cancela was wrong, that he had spoken out of turn and that foreign policy decisions are made by the president, Tabaré Vázquez. Consequently, Nin Novoa said, Cancela would be removed from the job. Later, the foreign minister then toned down Cancela’s “punishment,” explaining that rogue ambassador had been slapped on the wrist but not sacked.

Believe it or not, this succession of events was quite extraordinary. But surely they weren’t the end of the world. Having said that, it is not the done thing for a government to publicly sack or even tell off an ambassador posted abroad. Surely all governments reprimand or sack their diplomats, and possibly quite frequently. But they do it silently and not in the public eye. In other words: much more diplomatically. (Pun intended.)

The politics behind the affair are relatively easy to explain. Although President Vázquez belongs to the same party as his predecessor José “Pepe” Mujica, it is public knowledge that they belong to different factions within the Frente Amplio, and do not see eye-to-eye on many issues.

Moreover, Vazquez is known to be even less enamoured than his predecessor with the current Argentine government. And politicians from Uruguay — as well as those from Paraguay — have been lobbying against what they have seen as Argentina’s feet-dragging on an agreement with the EU. As in the case of Uruguay, there is no love lost for the Mercosur in Paraguay.

But — being the smaller members — both Uruguay and Paraguay were lonely voices in the Mercosur desert. Until quite recently, that is, when — perhaps pushed by her country’s current economic difficulties — Rousseff altered Brazil’s traditional position. She is now in favour of a “two-speed” agreement. In other words, member states should have the liberty of speeding up or delaying free trade negotiations with the EU, according to the Brazilian president.

Good news for Montevideo

The change in Brazil’s policy was good news in Uruguay. In addition to the president’s position, the opposition shares the negative perceptions of Mercosur. There are, obviously, some relevant exceptions. Walter Cancela is one of them. But he is a legacy of Mujica’s time. In fact, the latter was quick to join the political fray within the Broad Front, and, on June 4, he went public voicing his disagreement with Vázquez’s position. Which explains his follower, Cancela’s, rather undisciplined ways.

There is some speculation that the disagreement about the Mercosur’s direction, between incumbent president and predecessor has also occurred in Brazil, between Rousseff and former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Who — by the way — met President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner last Saturday to discuss unspecified “regional issues.”

If they chatted abut Mercosur, and were sincere with each other, they might have agreed that, unfortunately, the Mercosur bloc is at present far from a shining success story. The list of mutual complaints is quite long. The current disagreement between Argentina and Brazil about automobile trade is just one case in point. But, if the two big partners find it difficult to compromise with each other, there is obviously very little hope for the smaller and weaker partners. They simply lack the necessary leverage

Likewise, Mercosur does not seem to be very apt as a negotiating tool with third parties. The discussions about a trade agreement with the EU started exactly 20 years ago. And it seems quite clear that nothing, or almost nothing, has been achieved. True, the blame should be placed both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. But it is also true that other regions have managed to overcome difficulties and agreements with the EU are now in place.

The Washington effect

But what is even more worrying for the “two-speed” advocates is the fact that the EU seems likely to conclude a free trade agreement with the US quite soon. Does this matter? Yes. Other trade partners could suffer serious damages. And it seems that many decision makers in Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay are beginning to feel that the Mercosur is more of a liability than an asset. And that it is not delivering.

Some even say that the dream of the 1980s needs a complete overhaul or that it should be replaced by something different and more up to date.

So much so, that they are prepared to risk serious damage to the bloc and its future, or the wrath of reluctant partners like Argentina and Venezuela, in order to move forward over an agreement with the EU, which potentially seems to be more beneficial.

Possibly, this explains the Uruguay breach of protocol this week with their ambassador in Brussels, in order to avoid sending the wrong signals to the possible EU partners.

@andresfederman

CREDITS: BUENOS AIRES HERALD