lunes, 22 de diciembre de 2014

IN PRAISE OF PRAGMATISM


Our ‘strategic partnership’ with Russia may harm our future

Bad news: Argentina’s latest strategic partner of choice, Russia, is facing serious economic problems. The very bad news is that this happens at a time when the Republican Party is on the rise in the US — and is likely to win the 2016 presidential elections.
True, it could be argued that the term “strategic partnership” is —nowadays at least — rather rhetorical and vague. Only a notch above the term “memorandum of understanding,” or MOU in the parlance, a piece of paper often signed to justify official visits and provide a snippet of news for the newspapers.
By contrast, “strategic partnerships,” can, in some cases, even deserve a headline. Which, in the case of Russia and Argentina, could backfire with the US Republicans, who can be quite sensitive to this particular type of rhetoric.
Russia is not the superpower that it used to be in the good old days of the Soviet Union. In fact, its Gross Domestic Product is quite similar to that of Brazil and is only 15 percent of the United States’. But it is still a big power, which is determined to compete with the US. And that — under Russian President Vladimir Putin — dreams, once again, of restoring itself to its past glories. The Ukraine crisis offers sufficient evidence for this. But,more importantly, Russia is an atomic power. Unsurprisingly, “strategic partnerships” with the Russians are not taken lightly by those in Washington, especially if they happen to be Republicans. Who, in addition, do not seem to be particularly enamoured with Argentina of late. They also seem quite sensitive to President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s attitude towards the US. She, of course, does not seem to perceive Washington as a friend. And she shows it too.
Argentina’s strategic alliance with Russia was announced back in July. Then, in September, it became quite clear that Argentina would challenge the trade embargo imposed by the EU and the US on Russia, to punish its actions in Ukraine.
The following month — in a rather confusing style — it was announced that the Russian oil company Gazprom would be investing US$1,000 million in Argentine hydrocarbons. There were several other announcements, many of which were — to be realistic — just mere statements of intent.
Perhaps, on the strength of this, the Argentine president continued, or perhaps even increased, her aggressive attitude toward the US. In September there was her speech at the United Nations General Assembly, much of which focused on sovereign debt restructuring. Toward the US, it was far from kind. Neither were her latest comments last week on the Cuba-US rapprochement. The president denied Obama almost any credit and she conveyed her impression that the shift was a defeat for Washington. Even if that is the case (which it does not seem to be), it seemed quite unnecessary to rub Obama’s face in it. A comment about it being a ‘celebration for all sides’ — even if merely rhetorical — would have gone down much better.
True, the government has many reasons to feel unhappy at the US. It expected a helping hand on the legal confrontation with the hold-out/“vulture” funds and US Judge Thomas Griesa. But this never happened.
In addition, the US voted against the Argentine initiative on sovereign debt put forward at the UN General Assembly by the G77 and China. And then there are the negative comments on Argentine issues coming from the US government, including those from the Chargé d’Affaires at the US Embassy in Buenos Aires. So the unfriendliness seems to be somewhat mutual. And, perhaps, even justified.
Both countries have conflicting opinions about the way in which the Western world is organized. This includes bodies like the UN Security Council or international financial institutions. Clearly, Argentina has a different view. One which is, possibly, akin to that of the current Russian government. Unfortunately for both countries, they do not seem to be in the best position to challenge the status quo at this time. In addition to holding alternative views, they are experiencing financial troubles. There are, however, differences in terms of size, resilience and — why not? — muscle.
Putin’s government can get away with a number of things. At the end of the day it is still a big power and the US can, every now and then, request its cooperation to avoid some things getting out of hand in hot-button areas like the Middle East. Even if this cooperation is limited to not supporting a particularly troublesome group or state and allowing the US to deal with it on its own terms. In fact this has to do not only with Russia’s political and military muscle, but even with its geographical location.
Argentina lacks these advantages. And unfortunately, none of Russia’s plus points seems transferable to here. If, in addition, Russia’s economic problems preclude it from helping Argentina’s scarcity of foreign investment, then people are entitled to wonder what is the advantage of making so much noise about the strategic alliance and further provoking the US. While the president’s policy of alliances might seem totally coherent in terms of her vision of the world, it does not seem to carry much hope in practical terms. Perhaps the time has come for Argentina to exercise a much more pragmatic approach to foreign affairs? True, we may all feel a bit less heroic. And it will sad to abandon our diehard anti-imperialist mantra. But it might be much better for the country in the long term.

@andresfederman

CREDITS: BUENOS AIRES HERALD

lunes, 15 de diciembre de 2014

TIME FOR CHANGE (OF ATTITUDE)



Lima summit exposes Greenpeace irresponsibility

Last week, Greenpeace decided to make its own unique contribution to the difficult, stuttering negotiations at the COP 20, which finished yesterday in Lima.
True to style, they used a highly visible prank to make their point, illegally entering the Nazca Lines, a Peruvian archaeological treasure designated a World Heritage Site by UNESCO around 20 years ago. Access to the site is prohibited due to the frailty of the works of art (the “lines”) which are between 1,500 and 2,000 years old. Once inside, they placed cloth letters on the ground,. and in the process, they are likely to have damaged the relic or its surroundings. The message was aimed — Greenpeace said — at the 190 delegates meeting in Lima.
In the organization’s own words “20 Greenpeace activists from seven countries unfurled massive letters at the historic landmark of Nazca in Peru, delivering the message: ‘Time for Change: The Future is Renewable.’”
The message was directed, the NGO said in a statment, at “the world leaders and ministers at the ongoing UN climate talks, in Lima, who are failing to take real climate action, while countries like the Philippines, which is again being battered by a massive typhoon, are paying the price of their inaction.”
In fact, the whole stunt triggers some other difficult questions.
The first one has to do with obeying the law. This is not the first occasion in which Greenpeace has sent activists to engage in unlawful activities. In addition, this was a clear show of disrespect by a foreign organization and its activists toward the Peruvian people. In fact, Greenpeace does not even have an office in Peru. Confronted with the uproar, the NGO apologized, in the manner of someone who has made a minor mistake. But, I ask, is it enough?
It might be argued that these, and other similar actions, are “minor transgressions” justifiable for the sake of the greater good. But what is Greenpeace’s mandate to embark on such actions?
The election of the organization’s leadership does not involve any kind of popular vote. They are appointed at its International Annual General Meeting which involves the regional boards. And where do these boards come from? Who elects them?
According to Greenpeace “boards are usually elected by a voting membership of volunteers and activists, who are firmly rooted within the local environmental communities and are well positioned to represent the wider public in influencing Greenpeace decisions and policy.”
Please note the vagueness of the word “usually” and the phrase “represent the wider public.” It very much seems that — like most others in the world of NGOs — authorities and boards get to their positions because they are part of well-organized but informal (and never too explicit) professional NGO network.
Another question: was the message really targeted at the delegates?
For better or worst, mitigating the effects of climate change is about national and business (often conflicting) interests, as well as the economy and jobs.
Did the Greenpeace strategists really believe that such a message would influence national governments and get them to change their positions? It does not sound too credible. A cynic might be led to think that the real objective of the stunt was further promotion of the Greenpeace brand among the general public. But Mr and Mrs General Public did not have any immediate say in the COP 20 meeting taking place at the time of the prank. Thus, God forbid, some cynics might even say that such brand-promotion is directly linked to fundraising targets.
In fact, we are talking big money. In 2013, Greenpeace received US$282 million in donations from across the world. And they spent slightly more than 50 percent of that money — US$144 million — on fundraising (US$98.8 million) and organizational support (US$45.6 million). Quite a sizeable kitty.
That, combined with its numerous international staff, thousands of volunteers and millions of supporters worldwide means a lot of power in the hands of people who, whatever their good intentions, have no other mandate than their own.
True, their objectives are sound — and possibly are — worthy, even though in some cases they might appear slightly unrealistic. But sympathy for their objectives cannot mean endorsing their actions when these challenge the law. Especially, if such actions put people — Greenpeace volunteers or third parties — in harm’s way. A risk which the Greenpeace authorities themselves presume to exist.
This is clear from reading their 2011 report: “Security Policy describes Greenpeace International’s duty of care to our people who operate in places of higher risk, be this due to local conditions or as a result of our campaign activities. It obliges us to put measures in place to manage risk, and explains the limits to this, allowing our staff to make informed decisions prior to committing to activities on behalf of Greenpeace.”
The whole idea of a non-state organization engaging in activities that put their people in “high-risk” situations does not sound right. States have defence and security forces which, by the very nature of their duty, take risks. Non-governmental organizations have no legitimacy or mandate for putting anybody at risk. Even if they are volunteers.
In fact, nowadays, democratic states have enough trouble with “the bad guys” so as to have to deal with “the good guys” from Greenpeace. Its leaders might want to look again at the way they are doing things, as well as their attitudes toward the law and state authorities.


@andresfederman

lunes, 8 de diciembre de 2014

CFK, AS SEEN FROM MONTEVIDEO



On why the president should be elected to Parlasur

On a weekend trip to Montevideo, this reporter was surprised to find an unlikely supporter for President Cristina Kirchner’s bid to claim a seat in the Mercosur Parliament. It was in the form of a friend with close ties to Uruguay’s new President-elect Tabaré Vázquez, who is no fan of his boss’ Argentine counterpart, but would like to see her taking the helm of South America’s regional bloc nonetheless.
Political gossip exchange is a two way street, and with the aid of a generous amount of Uruguay’s wonderful Tannat red wine, I asked my friend, a member of the Broad Front, to put the argument to me, in exchange for enduring a grilling on 2015 from his side of the table.
My interlocutor listened carefully as I first explained the mounting controversy here over the president’s possible Mercosur candidacy. He immediately made his opinion clear: the clamourous Argentine opposition has got it wrong. Contrary to what they say, it would be ideal to see Cristina in that institution.
Let it be known, this softly-spoken Uruguayan is an expert on European Union theory and practice. So he knows how regional bodies work. Although he is no pro-Washington fanatic, he is convinced that Uruguay would be much better off closer to the US, even if that means being further from Mercosur. But he knows the inevitable political tensions that would arise between Uruguay and its two most powerful neighbours, Argentina and Brazil, would be untenable for Montevideo. Thus Mercosur remains the only available option.
But the regional body is in desperate need of a revival — and the current Argentine president could be the person to make this happen, he says.
There are many items on the agenda of a potential renewal. First, there is the fact that Mercosur lacks a full-time leader with strong political clout. The three different agencies which are supposed to lead Mercosur are headed by ministers, or deputy ministers, from the member countries. They are not full-time officers and the Mercosur does not seem to be their main priority, with individual domestic concerns more pressing. By contrast, the first manifestation of what is today known as the European Union — the European Coal and Steel Community — was by led by the French political operator Jean Monnet. True, he was not an elected politician in the traditional sense. But Monnet had cooperated with French, British and US leaders during the two World Wars, as well as the interwar period, to forge the basic elements of a long-term regional integration project. In 1919, France’s Georges Clemenceau and Great Britain’s Arthur Balfour appointed him deputy secretary-general of the League of Nations.
My friend remarks that Monnet had a lifelong commitment to the economics of peace, as well as a forceful and principled personality. So forceful that he ultimately resigned his position in the League of Nations in 1923, frustrated by the organization’s lack of effectiveness. He adds that credit for getting the European unity process in motion also goes to committed politicians such as Italian statesman Alcide De Gasperi, West Germany’s Konrad Adenauer and France’s Robert Schuman. He reminds me that each time the EU has appeared to be sinking to the doldrums of paralysis, it has been under the unfortunate stewardship of less capable European officials who lacked the clout to make things work.
Possibly the strongest complaint that the Uruguayans have against Argentina these days is protectionism. My interlocutor agrees with Vásquez that although “legitimate,” trade protectionism does his country no favours. He also points out that what may be negligible losses for Argentina translate into big deals for Uruguay. So, Argentina could perhaps be more selective over its protectionism. But to make that happen, some permanent and efficient mechanisms should be in place first. He is not alone in this view: only yesterday, this newspaper made the same point in its editorial.
It is always interesting to challenge an expert. So I pointed out that it took 27 years to get from that original European Coal and Steel Community to the first direct elections for a European Parliament. Even back in 1952, the original organization was better structured than today’s Mercosur. Not to mention the fact that, to this day, the European Parliament is not as powerful as the European Council and Commission. The Parlasur is unlikely to be operational any time in the near future, and its powers will be more than limited once it is finally here.
With a cheeky smile, my friend explains that the beauty of Cristina Kirchner being elected to Parlasur is not the additional status that she will accrue — even though this is something she will no doubt enjoy wholeheartedly. It’s that the position will truly afford her the necessary credentials to push things forward.
In his view, she has several things working in her favour. First, there is her current high-profile which, by the way, she obviously enjoys. Then there is her strong political ambition and equally strong will to make her own mark on history. She seems to have a strong commitment to South American unity, I’m told, coupled with (or perhaps triggered by) a certain rejection of the “powers that be” — by which he means the EU and the US. And then there is her personality, which can rub people the wrong way, but can get things done.
She is authoritative (possibly authoritarian?) and wants things done without too much regard for any institutional intricacies that may arise. She would be able to use both her credentials and her personality to shake Mercosur out of its inertia and cut through regional red tape. Some of the institution’s mechanisms are quite basic, but they could be used to breathe new life into Mercosur. And to do this, says the expert, you have to kick some ass. This does not necessarily require a seat in the still non-existent Parlasur, but rather access to a platform from which to do a bit of targeted screaming and look irate every now and then. And judging by her TV performances, she is still very good at that.


@andresfederman

lunes, 1 de diciembre de 2014

WARNING: 2015 AHEAD


Foreign affairs take back seat — and that’s a good thing
The Presidential elections are likely to be — by far — the most relevant political event of next year. And most local political issues, from crime rates to inflation or unemployment get linked to — and influenced by — an electoral campaign that seems to have started quite early.
Normally, foreign policy matters do not enter into that debate. The pressing issues seem to be closer to home. So candidates seem more interested in explaining to their voters how they plan to improve day-to-day life than to expand on their vision about how Argentina links and relates to the world. Horrible as it may sound, this might not be such a bad thing.
The truth is that messages that may go down well with the domestic voters, do not necessarily help to solve problems and find solutions with foreign counterparts. This is especially true in the case of high-profile issues. The paper pulp mill dispute with Uruguay seems to be a good example of this.
Many argue that the late Néstor Kirchner’s support of the Gualeguaychú environmentalists, which made Uruguayan’s life miserable over the Botnia pulp mill, is a good example of how decisions aimed at local political gains,trigger complicated foreign policy situations. In fact, the bilateral wounds from those episodes have not closed totally. Not to mention the fact that Uruguay’s next president Tabaré Vázquez was who, when in office, had to endure the pressures of “the big neighbour.”
Unfortunately, 2015 seems to bring another high profile issue in tow. Starting on January 1 — and once the RUFO clause expires — discussions will (or should) start, on the matter of what to do with the holdout/“vulture” funds. The latter are far from popular in Argentina. So the temptation to take a hard line against them is high. It would be easy for the government to rally support for a confrontation with the “vultures” and the US. Burning US flags is a popular hobby in many sectors of Argentine politics.
There is another possible scenario: the Government might prioritize gaining access to the international financial markets and decide to — grudgingly — reach an agreement with the creditors. In that case, some opposition candidates might choose to wrap themselves in an Argentine flag and denounce the government’s negotiations as damaging to the country’s best interests. To make matters worse, the new US Congress is not likely to be friendly to Argentina. And might not dismiss anti-American tirades as a mere ingredient of electioneering narrative. They could take them seriously.
The issue of the holdouts/“vultures” is possibly the most serious, given the risk of it becoming a campaign issue and getting out of hand. But is by no means the only one confronting Argentina’s foreign policy in 2015. Although they are unlikely to be in the campaign agenda, they will (hopefully) be in the Foreign Ministry’s radar. And the opposition candidates would be well advised to follow developments in those fronts closely, just in case they get into office.
Close to home is the above-mentioned case of Uruguay. President Mujica tended to have a quite patient attitude toward Argentina in spite of a few sparkles every now and then. It remains to be seen if his successor will follow suit, or if — based on his previous experiences — he has already dismissed the possibility of Argentina being a friendly partner. After all, there are a number of conflictive issues which range from the use of port facilities to Uruguayan complaints about Argentine protectionism.
Then there is Brazil. Dilma Rousseff seems ready to endorse an adjustment policy which might mean a slowdown in her country’s economic activity. Argentina’s exports to Brazil would be hit. And given Argentina’s own foreign trade needs, the government might need to put its best negotiators to work in order to keep the Brazilian door for Argentine exports as widely open as possible.
Further north, there is the case of Argentina’s friendly (some say too friendly) relations with Venezuela. President Nicolás Maduro’s government seems to be in serious trouble and making big efforts to blame its predicament outside its borders. The US is the obvious candidate. And in that process, Venezuela seems inclined to make alliances with governments that are not too palatable to Europe nor the US. There is the danger that — given the Chavista sympathies of a few politicians close to the government — some of his foreign policies could try to involve Argentina. Something that this country does not seem to need at all.
And then there is the case of Russia, Argentina’s latest “strategic partner.”
Over and above its policy on Crimea, Russia seems determined to anger the EU further by financing far-right European politicians, with the sole intention of making life more difficult for Europe’s traditional political parties. This is not seen positively within the EU. Being too closely associated with Putin could be read as an endorsement of such policies.
Again, something that Argentina does not need at all.


@andresfederman