The G20
summit has come and gone. Given the amount of time and space dedicated to the
subject, some stocktaking seems advisable. Not only on what seemed to be the
Argentine government’s main objective — the inclusion of the holdout/ “vulture”
funds issue on the G20 agenda — but also in terms of foreign policy priorities.
The good
news for ministers Kicillof and Timerman is that they can show written proof of
their feats. Those who feel close to the government will agree with Kicillof
that it is a landmark achievement. Those in the opposition will remark that a
17-word mention in point 12 of the final document (“We welcome the progress
made to strengthen the orderliness and predictability of the sovereign debt
restructuring process”) is not too impressive given it is part of a 21-point,
2,343-word document..
The same
applies to the paragraph included in the “Issues for further action” annex.
Supporters will see it as more proof of a job well done. Opponents will remark
that the paragraph is only a recommendation to follow the advice issued by the
International Capital Markets Association (ICMA) last August. Moreover, those
who prefer to base their analysis on cynicism rather than political
preferences, will remark that the phrase “issues for further action” often
become the worst-kept promises found in these kinds of international documents.
To be fair
to the ministers, it is true that their achievements were not obstacle-free.
Argentine bureaucrats are no different from their international colleagues.
They all seem to enjoy a good negotiation or fight over a couple of lines in a
rather lengthy international document that will only be read by a few people,
to be then quickly summarized for senior politicians, and more often than not,
forgotten during the return flight home from summits. In this particular case,
rumour has it that the US was reluctant to allow even a short mention of the
holdouts/ “vultures” issue. Hardly a surprise. But this time David overpowered
Goliath. And — as usual in this dyad — David plays the role of the morally
inspiring nice guy. But, is this good in terms of international politics?
The title
of one of the classics on this matter, Hans Morgenthau’s Power Among Nations,
seems to have the answer. Power and not the moral high ground is the key
instrument of international politics. Argentina is not the US’s David by choice
any more than Uruguay is happy about having its own Goliath in Argentina. Do
not repeat this to the children, but the desirability of the role of David
might be overrated.
However,
one values its G20 achievements. The government has to be credited with the
honesty of acknowledging that none of these achievements will have an impact on
Argentina’s current confrontation with US judge Thomas Griesa and the holdout/
“vulture” funds. Nobody can complain of being misled on the fact that the
benefits of this struggle are part of President Cristina’s legacy to the world.
The problem is that the world is quite large and often quite alien.
The list of
possible beneficiaries does not seem to include Argentina’s Latin American
neighbours and partners. Fortunately, for them there is no sovereign debt
restructuring on their horizons. Which begs the question: what are the other
priorities in Argentina’s foreign policy agenda for, say, the next three years?
One of the
biggest challenges is the country’s most important partner: Brazil. Despite
winning the elections, President Dilma Rousseff has lost power to the sectors
that have better chances of broadening the horizons of Brazil’s international
partnerships. And Rousseff — being the able politician she is — will not ignore
those signals. The impact on Argentina’s economy, and thus the local political
scenario, is likely to be significant.
Still close
to home, there is the long list of unresolved issues with Uruguay and Paraguay.
They range from trade to energy and once again there are plenty of sectors with
grievances against Argentina. True, they are Goliath Argentina’s “Davids.” But
in the next few years this Goliath’s power will be hindered by its economy. So
some serious thinking and subsequent negotiation seems quite advisable. And, in
all three cases, there are bilateral and multilateral factors to be taken into
consideration. While it does seem dormant, Mercosur is still there. And sooner
or later its founding members will have to decide where they want it to go with
it.
Still in
Latin America, there are other issues which seem to deserve some foresight.
Some argue that Venezuela is at the top of that list. That country’s
quite-unstable political situation might trigger surprise changes at very short
notice. Given Argentina’s “special relationship” with that country, it is
likely that there are a number of loose ends to sort out in terms of both
politics and economics. Some of them have more political implications abroad,
which transcend Latin America.
First there
is the Middle East factor, in which Venezuela seems to play a role associated,
in some cases, to the more complicated players in that area. In turn, this
bring into focus the relationship with the US, especially the “new” US with a
Republican majority in Congress.
And in an
interdependent world, this poses some questions about Argentina’s newest
“special relationship” — Russia, which is at odds with what members of the
opposition will denominate “traditional partners.” The US is, obviously, at the
top of that list. In such a complicated scenario, realism (cynicism?) might
prove to be the best option for planning Argentina’s future foreign policy.
@andresfederman
CREDITS: BUENOS AIRES HERALD

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