Pope
Francis, “Che” Guevara, Evita, Jorge Luis Borges, Diego Maradona, Lionel Messi.
You choose the order of relevance but they are all Argentine names that left or
are leaving a mark in our world’s history. But, beyond its contributions in
terms of personalities, Argentina has other claims to fame. The country is not
a world power. Possibly not even an emerging one. But the fact is that — at
least in the world of global finance — it has managed and is still managing to
unleash processes and debates that shape the way in which things happen and are
done.
The Baring
crisis back in 1890 was an interesting starting point. It was not the first
foreign debt problem faced by the country. But what made that default special,
is that it dragged the City into serious problems. Back in London, the Barings
Bank had been recklessly greedy. It had floated the debt on behalf of the
Argentine government. But the terms of the loan were so profitable to the
lenders that — in order to maximize its gain — Baring had kept much of the
Argentine bonds in its own vaults, instead of marketing them and, thus,
spreading the risk. When Argentina defaulted, the inevitable happened. Barings
faced a bankruptcy which would have — in turn — affected the rest of the City.
The Bank of England could not — on its own — cope with the situation. So it had
to ask for help from the French and Russian Central Banks to avert the crisis.
An interesting footnote to this story. Back in 1995, Baring was — once again —
facing terminal difficulties. This time on account of reckless speculation from
Nick Leeson, one of its officials. Rumour has it that Barings’ authorities went
to knock the Bank of England’s door to get help. And were told that “The Old
Lady of Threadneedle Street” helps British Banks. But only one time. And Baring
had already used that facility back in 1890.
Argentina
contributed to world financial history again in 1956. Overwhelmed by its debts
with official creditors Argentina asked for French help. Paris gathered the
creditor governments, and an agreement with Argentina was reached in May, 1956.
The Paris Club was born. As informal and quite loose organization with the
mission of setting guidelines for, and dealing with, the difficulties faced by
borrowing countries with their government creditors. Despite the fact the
organization remains quite loose and formal (by comparison with, say, the IMF),
it has developed quite comprehensive “rules of engagement” for creditor
governments to deal with foreign debtors’ issues.
Then, in
December 2001, Argentina set a new milestone. Under President Rodríguez Saá,
the country defaulted on its foreign debt. It was an impressive figure, over
US$100 billion, and considered to be the biggest default in world history.
Argentina was in the midst of a terrible economic crisis. This perhaps explains
the oddity of the country’s Congress welcoming this first formal declaration of
bankruptcy with a cross-party standing ovation. It was Néstor Kirchner who —
after becoming President in 2003 — started the long and protracted process of
debt restructuring which included a substantial reduction of nominal amounts
(“haircut” in the jargon). A vast majority of creditors (93%) entered the
restructuring. The current conflict with the 7% holdouts is a last legacy of
that process. And it has highlighted what seems to be a vacuum in international
laws and regulations governing sovereign countries’ debt issued in, or under
the jurisdiction of, the major financial centres.
In one of
the statements it issued at the end of last week, the Argentine government made
the US responsible for any damages caused by decisions of its Judiciary, namely
Judge Griesa. So, if this happens, the US government faces a liability because
of a decision from a Judge that is independent from both the US executive or
legislative branches. Interesting concept in terms of international relations,
especially because it follows that the government could be forced to twist a
judicial court’s ruling, if it affects another country. What happens in this
case with the judiciary’s independence? An interesting constitutional quagmire.
The other —
obvious — question is about how much power is vested in the hands of a minority
of creditors. In the case of a company seeking protection from its creditors,
and offering a repayment scheme, a majority of — say 65% — approving the deal,
makes it compulsory for all the creditors. This is not what applies with
sovereign debt. Perhaps the time has come to protect the interests of the
majority of sovereign debt creditors in a way similar to normal bankruptcies.
There is
also the issue about the legitimacy of purchasing defaulted and devalued debt
titles, with the sole purpose of collecting their full value in subsequent
court actions. There is a strong body of legal opinion which says that such
speculative operations should be definitely banned. This has to do not only
with ethics but also with the practicalities of dealing with sovereign debt
restructurings. In addition to G-77 + China, Mercosur and regional partners, a
number of other voices are being raised in favour of Argentina’s position. They
include the IMF, or top business publications like the Financial Times and The
New York Times. It is not that they love creditors and investors less, but that
they love a healthy international financial system more.
@andresfederman
CREDITS: BUENOS AIRES HERALD




