BITTER NEIGHBOURS

By Andrés Federman

For The Herald

For many years, the idea of an Argentine-Uruguayan “brotherhood” was taken for granted by the local narrative in schools and official speeches. It was based on two pillars: one is the combination of geography, history and economics linking both countries; the other is a shared culture.

As for the latter, perhaps we should use the widest definition. So it ranges from mate and tango to Onetti and Páez Vilaró as well as Punta del Este, the summer haven for many wealthy Argentines. And many would include in that culture, the odd US dollar that gets lost on its way to AFIP and ends up in Punta del Este real estate or a nest egg in a Uruguayan bank. Nothing too serious. Just honest-to-God Argentine high middle-class tax evasion.

In terms of geography, both countries share — and have to “manage” — the River Plate and the Uruguay River. Not an easy job. Moreover, both countries compete for the merchant shipping business using the same river. This, in fact, triggered the latest spat, when Argentina decided to ban trans-shipment of Argentine cargo at Uruguayan ports. Luis Almagro, Uruguay’s Foreign Minister, accused the Argentine Under- Secretary for Ports, Horacio Tettamanti, of wanting to “harm the Uruguayans.” In turn, the latter replied that Argentina is not going to do the “valet parking” service for the Uruguayan ports. And that somebody in that country is delusional in the belief that Uruguay is going to become a major logistics centre while Argentina simply watches things happen. He defined the struggle for developing Argentina’s merchant shipping and logistic services as “a matter of life or death.”

If we leave shipping and paper mills aside, the most evident of Uruguay’s current woes related to its neighbour stem from Argentina’s own problems, namely the drop in its US dollars reserves. This forces trade restrictions harming Urugua-yan businesses that have in Argentina their main export markets. And it discourages foreign tourism much of which has Uruguay as its summer destination: the number of Argentine tourists last January and February dropped by 17 percent, while Brazilian tourism increased by 36 percent in that same period.

So the brotherhood seems to be going sour. In addition to Almagro’s words, an opinion poll made public last month revealed that 61 percent of Uruguayans consider Argentina to be the country which is less friendly to them. Even President Mujica, during his recent visit to the US made some comments which — although not specific — seemed aimed at the brothers across the River Plate. “We do not take bribes,” was one of them. So when and why did the brotherhood become so acrimonious? Many would agree that the controversy over the Botnia paper mill was the starting point. For Uruguay, that industry is important not only in terms of foreign direct investment or exports but also in terms of bringing jobs and business to an impoverished region of the country. The fact that the late President Néstor Kirchner condoned and endorsed the blocking of the Gualeguaychú — Fray Bentos bridge will not be easily forgotten. The problems listed above, which are not the only ones, continue to add controversies, and seem to be marking an end to the brotherhood era.

Obviously, it takes two to tango, so both sides of the bilateral relation could have done things better, bit their tongue every now and then or be prepared to lose some “family battles” with less of a bitter aftertaste. It may be now water under the bridge.

A realpolitik fan could argue that Argentina’s foreign policy has more important problems than Uruguay. And that it is not Argentina’s job to look after a country which — in any case — has a near to nil retaliatory power. True, this would be at loggerheads with the regional integration and Latin American brotherhood narrative. But that is everyday life in international politics.

More importantly: realpolitik can also be mistaken politik, especially in international relations. In the past few years, Uruguay shifted a good part of its Argentine-dependence towards Brazil-dependence. This change in trade and tourism figures was reflected in Uruguay’s Mercosur policies. In any vote related to Mercosur international trade in general, Uruguay is an automatic ally of Brazil.

So rather than the “little country” (paisito in Uruspeak), we might be looking at the rebirth of the myth that went along with “bilateral brotherhood.” It was “Uruguay is South America’s Switzerland.” And it won’t be very wise to have an acrimonious relation with that kind of country.

@andresfederman

CREDITS: BUENOS AIRES HERALD

PACTA SUNT SERVANDA?

Interest declared: For all its worth, the author believes that the Memorandum of Understanding   which Argentina entered with Iran on January 2013, in order to investigate the AMIA bombing, was a total and absolute mistake. This said, it should be noted that the MOU was subscribed by the Argentine Government and then ratified by Congress.  The fact that only the Government loyalists voted in favour, ignoring the strong views and criticisms from those who opposed it, is - let's face it - a moot point. It is a democratically elected governments' prerogative, especially if it has congressional approval, to make grossly mistaken decisions. 

                                                  

Unfortunately, last week's ruling by a Federal Appeals Court declaring the MOU unconstitutional and suspending it  -at least temporarily - added another mistake to the mistake. And two wrongs do not make one right.

One of the basic legal rules in the relations between states ,is that of " Pacta sunt servanda ". In plain English it means that nation states should stick to the agreements into which they have entered. The recent legal ruling on the Iran MOU, prevents Argentina from complying with "Pacta". There is an exception to "Pacta Sunt Servanda". And it goes by the name "Rebus sic stantibus". It allows the parties to walk away from their agreements if circumstances change. But Rebus applies to fundamental structural situations and not to the decision of an appeals court. Especially, if the latter issues such a ruling fifteen months after the Argentine President announced the MOU and fourteen months after it was passed by Congress.

Possibly, neither the US nor the European countries will be too concerned about Argentina's actions. First, because -despite the apparent moderation of the new Iranian President Hassan Rohani - they are not too close with Iran. And second because they are conscious of the weight they carry, so partners take a more circumspect view about Pacta and Rebus when dealing with them. But there are smaller countries which may think differently. And Argentina has been making an effort, in the past few years, to increase its trade and political links with many of these countries. The way in which Argentina is dealing with the Iran MOU is likely to raise some eyebrows.

Interestingly enough, the MOU never became really operational. During long months it was a case of much ado about nothing. Granted, there was action in the courts from the opponents to the Memorandum and verbal skirmishes between government and opposition. Add to that, a few well publicised meetings of the Jewish Community organizations with the authorities, and that will be the sum total. Moreover, some argue that the Argentine Government fell for the ploy of the centuries-old Persian diplomacy. In order to silence the Argentine demands at the UN General Assembly, it entered into an agreement that could not and would not be implemented. And that -when this became clear -it caused embarrassment to the Argentine Government. So -at this time -both sides benefit a from politically cost-free way out of the whole business.

If that is the case, the Federal Appeals Court obliged the two governments. We will never know this for sure. But, right now, both the Iranian and Argentine Foreign Ministries seem quite comfortable. The Iranians are blaming the ruling for the "lost opportunity" of "uncovering the truth" , thus clearing the Iranian suspects in the process. And the Argentine government claims that the two Federal Court judges stood on the way of the Iranian suspects having to answer questions. A cynic would argue that -given the lack of any progress in the implementation of the MOU - the outcome seems to suit everybody. And ,after all, the Argentine opposition has also scored some points. So everybody can feel happy.

True, the government has annunced that it will appeal the ruling. But those in the know point out that this is a conveniently long process which will last at least twelve months and could -eventually- have a result after this Presidency ends. An eternity in Argentine or even international politics.

Although the MOU with Iran is clearly a foreign policy issue, both government and opposition seem too interested on the domestic implications, so as to lose sight of the international picture. This is partly understandable because of the dimension of the AMIA tragedy. But the fact remains that there is much to learn from the rights and wrongs in the response of the Argentine political system to the AMIA-Iran MOU situation. And about the way in which Argentina enters into international agreements, 

On this point, there is a most interesting sentence in the Australian Government's report to the "UN's Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment." It reads:  "It is Australia’s practice not to ratify a treaty until domestic law and policy ensures compliance with its obligations. A working group of officials from all jurisdictions has been formed to carry forward implementation arrangements". An interesting tip from the Aussies.

@AndresFederman

Credits: BUENOS AIRES HERALD

SPIN REQUIRED

To say that the US and Argentine governments do not see eye to eye on the ways and means of dealing with the challenge of drug trafficking is more than an understatement. Last week, Security Secretary Sergio Berni rebuked what sounded like a US State Department’s critical comment about Argentina still facing “the challenge of controlling the Triple Frontier” with the phrase “they export death.”

There are, in fact, some clear and present policy differences between both countries. One case in point is the role of the military in combating drug trafficking.

To cite the US’ Joint Military Southern Command’s mission statement: “We work with our partners to address the growing threat of transnational organized crime (...) Drug trafficking represents the epicentre of illicit trafficking, serving as the predominant means by which Transnational Criminal Organizations obtain money and increased power in the region” (http://www.southcom.mil/ourmissions).

The Argentine position is that the armed forces have no business in fighting crime. As this daily reported on January 18, Defence Minister Agustín Rossi pointed out that “the National Defence Law prevents the Armed Forces from taking part in any kind of domestic activity” and made it clear that “President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner was not planning to reopen the debate on the issue.” Some readers might think that this is in blatant contradiction with the Army’s current participation in social work. They may be right.

But back to the drugs issue. There is abundant evidence that a number of consignments which leave Argentina, have Europe as a point of arrival. Just remember the 944 kilograms of cocaine seized by the authorities on arrival in Spain, in an aircraft chartered by — at least — one of the Juliá brothers back in 2011. Consequently, a number of EU countries cooperate permanently with Argentina. And this “condemns” the US and Argentina to cooperate with each other, given that both share partnerships with the Europeans. In fact it seems safe to say that — in spite of the shouting matches — the US’ DEA and Argentina cooperate already.

But over and above policy differences, international cooperation in this kind of issues often presents practical problems. Take the case of the so-called “controlled deliveries.” It involves one drug enforcement authority letting a detected consignment leave its frontiers, in coordination with their counterparts in the destination country. This allows the latter to tail the consignment in order to capture the recipients and get hold of the big fish. Wise as this might seem, it has difficulties. In the case of Argentina, the power to authorize such an operation rests with the judiciary. But in many European countries, the authority is in the hands of the enforcement agencies. And reaching agreements between those two different lines of business is not always easy. This is just one example of why good cooperation relations are necessary. Even for hardened professional law-enforcement people, life is easier if their masters are not exchanging derogatory comments.

So what triggered the last confrontation? It is suggested that too many words with too little spin. Take, for example, the first salvo about the triple frontier. It is no secret that the place is a trouble spot. Argentina knows, and the US knows that Argentina knows. So the wording of the report seemed aimed at putting more pressure on Argentina to work harder and — possibly — to allow the US to offer more help. Or to get involved. But those that drafted the State Department’s report, and whoever cleared it for publication, did not take into account Argentina’s internal political situation. It was quite predictable that the opposition press and politicians would pick up the report’s message and use it to fire a broadside against the government.

Berni’s harsh words were — in this context — almost predictable, given the “Cristinista” political style. Berni raised the ante and was — many would say — outright insulting. It was his way of saying “we do not give in to pressure and you know it, so you are not being helpful.” In fact, if the US wanted to achieve any kind of change, it had many more chances to achieve the objective through discreet negotiations.

But Sergio Berni also lost. Government administration, included specifically-targeted funding is not decided by gods. They are decided by frail individuals. And among these frailties we should count that of not liking to be called “death exporters.” So any Argentine application to Washington for funding in that class of issues, or other kind of help, might be rejected or delayed.

So what to do next time? — and sooner or later there will be a next time. A healthy ration of spin used by both sides could do the trick. For the unaware: “spin” is a word coined in the US but then re-coined in the UK — and to the level of total copyright ownership — by former Prime Minister Tony Blair’s people. It essentially means: “Twist and turn so as to give an intended interpretation to a message in order to make it less embarrassing.” Please note. It is not about lying. It is about all involved limiting embarrassment.

@andresfederman

Credits: BUENOS AIRES HERALD

BRAZIL'S RISKY BET

Brazil is hosting the FIFA World Cup next month and the Olympic Games in 2016.In theory, both events are the ideal showcase to project a country's image. Under the headline "The world has their eye on Brazil" , its government announces that 18,000 journalists have been accredited to cover the World Cup. And the broadcasters will be offering conventional TV coverage as well as a number of applications for smart phones. Not to mention the fact that the Brazilian Government plans to offer full 4 G mobile phone service. The latter means that -in addition to conventional press coverage - word of mouth, news, and comments will instantly go around the world through the social networks. And -given the tens of thousands visitors expected - there is much word of mouth potential there. Loads of which will find its way into news programs if they happen to fall short of news.

You cannot envisage a better way of engaging massive non-state audiences, the target of any public diplomacy effort. True, the interest of much of this audience is limited to football, regardless of the venue. But football is amazingly democratic and attracts massive amounts of business and political decision makers. Those are the good news.

The not-so-good news are that a significant number of Brazilians are in a state of protest. Their main grievance is that too much money is being spent on a wrong priority like the World Cup. They demand instead, better health, education and transport services as well as less inflation and corruption. Many of the protesters are middle class students. But, in addition to them, poorer Brazilians who live in the favelas complain about  police brutality as well as being caught in the cross-fire of the war between the police and the drug dealers which have made the shanty towns their stronghold.

Last year, during the Confederation Cup, hundreds of thousands took to the streets to protest about the money being spent on the World Cup. Many were injured and at least one person was killed. Also, a few days ago, a young dancer was beaten to death in a favela. His neighbors accused the police and staged a violent demonstration.

Both groups seem determined to stage more protests next month, during the tournament. And there is no guarantee that the demonstrations will be non-violent. Even if the demonstrators wish to remain peaceful, there is a looming threat posed by the very people in charge of keeping law and order: the police. First because they are putting strong pressure on the government demanding pay increases. And second, because out of lack of training or other motives , the fact is that the recent incident of the dead young dancer was by no means unique.

The people in charge of Brazil's public diplomacy sitting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have good reasons to feel unhappy. Most reports say that the June 2013 massive protests were non-partisan. So there are not many leaders of organized structures with whom to negotiate. The same seems to be the case with the people living at the bottom of the social ladder. Perhaps some leaders are to be found there, but the only way in which they can remain in the leadership is seeming to be as inflexible as possible. As for the police, the government is making a very serious training effort in order to avoid unnecessary violence. But the fine line between enforcement of law and order and wanton violence can get very thin. And then there is the possibility of an agent provocateur within the force.

So there is a possible worst scenario of images of violence and perhaps fatal casualties  depicted in TV sets, printed press, and multimedia platforms as well as photographs and comments from individuals, rolling into  the social networks. And then there is the horror scenario: the same images of violence but with foreign visitors as the victims.

In face of the October Presidential elections, Dilma Rousseff -who only very recently was officially appointed as the PT's candidate - will have much to be concerned about. Imaginably, her government is doing its best in terms of intelligence , training and disciplining of its police force. It would look as there is not much more than it can do.

So Dilma's people seem to have chosen to turn the weakness into a potential strength. The Secretary General of the Presidency, Gilberto Carvalho, stated last week that the Government supports the idea of protests during the World Cup. And that this "would show to the world the full strength of Brazil's democracy".  A brave face for a risky, but unavoidable, bet. Unless, of course, some backroom negotiations with one or more of the players take place successfully.

Credits: BUENOS AIRES HERALD